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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three essays on banking and corporate finance. 
The first essay studies the relationship between interest-rate derivative usage and bank 
lending. Using recent data that cover a full business cycle, this paper documents a direct 
relationship between interest-rate derivative usage by U.S. banks and growth in their 
commercial and industrial (C&I) loan portfolios. This positive association holds for 
interest-rate options contracts, forward contracts, and futures contracts. This result is 
consistent with the implication of Diamond’s model (1984) that predicts that a bank’s use 
of derivatives permits better management of systematic risk exposure, thereby lowering 
the cost of delegated monitoring, and generates net benefits of intermediation services.
Using recent data that spans a full business cycle, the second essay examines how 
derivative usage affects the interest-rate sensitivity of bank holding companies from 1998 
to 2003. The major finding of this study is that stock returns of a bank holding company 
using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes, controlling for balance-sheet 
composition and asset size. This economically significant finding suggests that interest- 
rate derivatives allow banks to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest 
rates and thereby increase their potential to better manage their interest-rate risk 
exposure. This result is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) prediction in which a bank can 
use interest-rate derivatives to hedge against interest-rate risk.
iii
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Previous research investigates how corporate finance managers make their bond- 
maturity decisions. The third essay is exploratory, investigating the relationship between 
duration and bond characteristics. The relationship between firm features and the 
durations of 8,627 corporate debt issues placed by U.S. corporations in public markets 
between 1990 and 2002 is examined. The major finding of the study is that firm quality, 
as measured by credit rating, is directly related to bond duration. The findings also 
suggest that bond duration is inversely related to firm size, that regulated non-fmancial 
firms have longer bond duration, and that syndicated offerings have longer duration than 
non-syndicated offerings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three essays on banking and corporate finance. 
The first two essays are closely related to the banks’ use of derivatives. The choice of 
these two topics is motivated by Diamond’s (1984) theory of financial intermediation. 
According to Diamond (1984), banks serve as delegated monitors with a comparative 
advantage to small depositors in monitoring and enforcing loan-contract provisions.
Diamond shows that portfolio diversification within financial intermediaries is the 
financial-engineering technology that allows banks to lower the cost of delegated 
monitoring and thereby to generate net benefits of intermediation services. In Diamond’s 
model, banks find it optimal to eliminate all diversifiable risks because the resulting 
equilibrium enables banks to monitor loan contracts efficiently and avoid costly 
liquidation.
An implication of Diamond’s model is that banks should not assume any 
nondiversifiable risks unless they have special advantages in managing them. One of the 
most important risks that banks face is interest-rate risk. Banks do not have special 
advantages in bearing interest-rate risk. Therefore, they use interest-rate derivatives to 
hedge against that risk. In theory, the existence of an active derivative market should 
increase the potential for banks to move toward their desired levels of interest risk.
1
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In one of his speeches (2004), Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board from August of 1987 to February of 2006, states that complex financial 
instruments such as derivatives have contributed to the development of an efficient, 
flexible, and resilient financial system. The potential of derivative instruments to reduce 
the interest-rate risk exposure of banks has been widely recognized; however, the 
tremendous increase in the use of derivatives by banks in the last two decades has 
triggered regulators’ concerns as to whether banking firms have used derivatives 
primarily for hedging or for speculation. A major concern facing policymakers and bank 
regulators today is the possibility that the rising use of derivatives has increased the 
riskiness of individual banks and of the banking system as a whole.
The first essay in this study addresses the hedging vis-a-vis speculation question 
by examining the relationship between bank lending and derivative usage. There are two 
risk components in a bank’s loan portfolio: systematic risk and unsystematic risk. 
Diamond demonstrates that interest-rate derivative contracts allow banks to reduce their 
exposure to systematic risk in their loan portfolios. This risk reduction allows banks to 
take further advantage of diversification. As a result, banks are able to make more loans 
without changing the total risk level of the loan portfolio. This position consequently 
increases the banks’ abilities to provide more intermediation services. One major 
implication of Diamond’s theory of financial intermediation is that derivative contracts 
facilitate loan growth.
The relationship between derivative usage and lending activity has been studied in 
recent years. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) evaluate an equation relating the 
determinants of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) lending to the impact of derivatives on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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C&I loan lending activity. They document a positive relationship between C&I loan 
growth and the use of derivatives over a sample period from 1985 to 1992. They find that 
derivative markets allow banks to increase lending activities at a greater rate than they 
would have otherwise. Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences 
in the financial characteristics of banking organizations that use derivatives when 
compared to those that do not. They find that banks that use derivatives grow their 
business-loan portfolio faster than banks that do not use derivatives. Pumanandam (2004) 
also reports that the derivative users make more C&I loans than non-users.
There are two major research questions that arise in the literature with respect to 
derivative usage: Does derivative usage facilitate loan growth, and if not, is there a 
negative association between lending activity and derivative usage? Using recent data 
that cover a full business cycle, the first essay in this study revisits these two questions to 
ascertain if a significantly positive relationship still exists between bank lending activity 
and derivative usage.
The second essay investigates the relationship between banks’ derivative usage 
and their interest-rate risk exposure. An implication of the Diamond (1984) model is that 
banks should not assume any risks that are not diversifiable unless the banks have special 
advantages in monitoring them. Thus, in Diamond’s model, banks find it optimal to 
hedge all interest-rate risk either by using a derivative approach or by matching the 
maturity of assets and liabilities as closely as possible. The popularity of derivative usage 
is due to the fact that derivatives provide a relatively inexpensive means for banks to 
change their interest-risk exposure. As stated by Hirtle (1997), the existence of an active 
derivative market should increase the potential for banks to move toward their desired
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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levels of interest risk. This potential benefit has been widely recognized, and the question 
that has arisen is whether or not banks have used derivatives primarily to reduce the risks 
arising from their other banking activities (for hedging) or to achieve higher levels of 
interest-rate risk exposure (for speculation).
The second essay tests Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that derivative instruments 
allow banks to better manage their interest-rate risk exposure. Specifically, an 
examination is made of the role of derivatives in determining the interest-rate sensitivity 
of bank holding companies’ (BHC) net worth, while controlling for the influence of on- 
balance-sheet activities and other bank-specific characteristics.
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to investigate the 
factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their debt issues. In the third 
essay, the duration of debt issues is examined. As an exploratory investigation, the third 
essay searches for potential linkages between the various theories and empirical findings 
from the previous literature on debt maturity and bond duration. Some questions about 
the determinants of debt maturity may also be answered by examining the firms’ duration 
choices. Duration measures the number of years required to recover the true cost of a 
bond, considering the present value of all coupon and principal payments received in the 
future. Debt maturity focuses more on matching the cash flow generated from the chosen 
project to the life of the project. Research on comparing both approaches may discern 
whether firms focus on duration or maturity. Hypotheses that have been offered to 
explain corporate debt maturity are used to examine the firms’ duration choices to see if 
factors that influence maturity choices also affect bond duration. A sample of 8,627 debt 
issues from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database is examined to identify the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
important factors in determining the length of duration of public, non-convertible debt. 
Macaulay’s Duration is used as the dependent variable to test the theoretical hypotheses 
where bond duration is influenced by signaling and asymmetric information as well as 
agency problems.
The organizational plan for the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 examines the 
relationship between interest-rate derivative usage by U.S. banks and growth in their 
commercial and industrial loan portfolios. Chapter 3 investigates the role of derivatives in 
shaping bank holding companies’ (BHC) interest-rate risk exposure in recent years. 
Chapter 4 tests theoretical hypotheses where bond duration is influenced by signaling and 
asymmetric information as well as agency problems. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the 
conclusions, implications, and recommendations for future research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
BANK LENDING AND INTEREST-RATE 
DERIVATIVES
Introduction
The relationship between the use of derivatives and lending activity has been 
studied in recent years. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) evaluate an equation relating 
the determinants of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) lending and the impact of 
derivatives on C&I loan lending activity. They document a positive relationship between 
C&I loan growth and the use of derivatives over a sample period from 1985 to 1992. 
They find that the derivative markets allow banks to increase lending activities at a 
greater rate than the banks would have otherwise. Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001) 
examine the major differences in the financial characteristics of banking organizations 
that use derivatives relative to those that do not. They find that banks that use derivatives 
grow their business-loan portfolio faster than banks that do not use derivatives. 
Pumanandam (2004) also reports that the derivative users make more C&I loans than 
non-users. There are two major research questions that arise in the literature: Does the 
use of derivatives facilitate loan growth? If not, is there a negative association between 
lending activity and derivative usage? Using recent data that cover a full business cycle, 
this essay revisits these questions to ascertain whether a direct relationship still exists.
6
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This essay differs from the previous research in several aspects. First, it uses more 
recent data. Few of the previous research studies cover the period from 1996 through 
2004. During this period, the use of interest-rate derivatives for individual banks is even 
more extensive than in earlier studies, rising from notional amounts of $27.88 trillion at 
the end of December 1996 to $62.78 trillion at the end of 2004.1 Given the substantial 
change in the use of derivatives, the research inferences drawn in the previous studies 
based on less derivative usage may not hold under the current circumstances. Therefore, 
the use of more recent data in this essay will shed more light on the most recent impact of 
derivative usage on bank lending activity.
Second, the sample period in this essay covers a full business cycle, thereby 
providing a better indication of the relative variability of lending activities experienced 
by commercial banks over this period. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) document a 
universal downward trend of C&I lending over a sample period of 1985 to 1992, a period 
during which the economy experienced a significant cyclical downturn. In contrast, my 
sample enables me to focus on a more comprehensive picture regarding the impact of 
derivative usage on lending activity through the different stages of the business cycle, 
such as economic boom and economic recession.
Finally, the definitions of several variables in the Call Reports are different prior 
to 1995. For example, futures and forwards are reported together in the Call Report data. 
It is more difficult for researchers to examine the effect of different derivative 
instruments on a bank’s lending activities, since swaps and forwards may have different
1 The notional am ount is the predeterm ined dollar principal on w hich the exchanged interest 
payments are based. The notional am ounts o f  derivatives reported are not an accurate m easure o f  derivative 
use because o f  reporting practices that tend to overstate the actual positions held by banks. Even though 
notional values do not reflect the m arket value o f  the contracts, they are the best proxy available for the 
usage and the extent o f  usage o f  interest-rate derivatives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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characteristics from futures and options. The sample period of the research in this essay 
(Chapter 2) is a time period over which there is a specific definition and consistent 
measurement of each interest-rate derivative instrument in the Call Reports. Therefore, 
the construction of these variables will be more accurate and much more detailed than the 
ones used in previous studies.
The sample in this essay represents FDIC-insured commercial banks with total 
assets greater than $300 million as of March 1996 that have a portfolio of C&I loans. 
Following Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), I evaluate an equation relating the 
determinants of C&I lending and the impact of derivatives on C&I lending activity. The 
major finding in this essay is that the interest-rate derivatives allow commercial banks to 
lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest rates, which enables banks to 
increase their lending activities without increasing the total risk level faced by the banks. 
This consequently increases the banks’ abilities to provide more intermediation services. 
Furthermore, a positive and significant association between lending and derivative 
activity indicates that the net effect of derivative use on C&I lending is complementary. 
That is, the complementary effect dominates any substitution effect.
Additionally, this positive association holds for interest-rate options contracts, 
forward contracts, and futures contracts, suggesting that banks using any form of these 
contracts, on average, experience significantly higher growth in their C&I loan portfolios. 
Furthermore, C&I loan growth is positively related to capital ratio and negatively related 
to C&I loan charge-offs. The findings in this essay are confirmed after a robustness 
check.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Examining the relationship between the C&I loan growth and derivative usage 
poses a potential endogeneity problem because the derivative-use decision and lending 
choices may be made simultaneously. To address this problem, an instrumental-variable 
approach is employed. Specifically, I estimate the probability that a bank will use 
derivatives in the first-stage specification, then I use the estimated probability of 
derivative usage as an instrument for derivative activity in the second-stage C&I loan 
growth equation. The probit specification for this instrumental variable is based on Kim 
and Koppenhaver (1992).
Chapter 2 is organized as follows: The following section describes the sample and 
data sources. A discussion of the empirical specifications for commercial and industrial 
lending is provided in the third section of this chapter. Next, the empirical results are 
presented in the fourth section. The fifth section of this chapter provides robustness test 
results, and the final section concludes the first essay of this dissertation.
Data and Sample Description
This section describes the sample selection criteria, the lending activity 
experience by FDIC-insured commercial banks from the fourth quarter of 1996 through 
the fourth quarter of 2004, as well as the interest-rate derivative products used by sample 
banks during the nine-year sample period.
Sample Description
The sample of banks includes FDIC-insured commercial banks with total assets 
greater than $300 million as of March 1996. Of these institutions, banks that have no 
commercial and industrial loans are excluded. The sample ranges from 942 banks in 
March of 1996 to 467 banks in December of 2004. Institutions that are liquidated during
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the sample period are included in the sample before liquidation and excluded from the 
sample for the periods after liquidation. Banks that merge during the sample period are 
included in the sample. By construction, the sample is therefore free from survivor bias. 
Balance sheet data and interest-rate derivative-usage information are obtained from the 
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) filed with the Federal Reserve System. 
State employment data are obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.
Lending Activity
Because the accessibility of credit depends importantly on banks’ roles as 
financial intermediaries, loan growth is an important measure of intermediaries’ 
activities. Following Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), I use C&I loan growth as a 
measure of lending activity because such a measure performs a critical function in 
channeling funds between the financial and the productive sectors of the economy. Table 
1 presents year-end data for bank C&I loan lending activity for the sample banks from 
1996 through 2004. The sample period covers a full business cycle and thereby provides 
a better indication of the relative variability of lending activities experienced by the 
commercial banks in different stages of a business cycle. Panels B through E report data 
for four categories of institutions classified by total asset size. Corresponding to the 
acceleration of C&I loans in the late 1990s, the average ratio of C&I loans to total assets 
increases steadily, from 12.44 percent at the year-end of 1997 to 13.15 percent at the 
year-end of 2000. Then, from year-end 2001 to year-end 2003, the average ratio of C&I 
loans to total assets exhibits a downward trend, which corresponds to the economic 
recession beginning in March of 2001. As panels B through E report, this pattern exists
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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across different sizes of banks, with the largest decline occurring for banks having total 
assets greater than $10 billion. This decline stops at year-end 2004 when the overall 
economy experiences more rapid growth.
Interest-rate Derivative Products
The use of interest-rate derivatives by banks has grown dramatically in recent 
years, rising from notional amounts of $27.88 trillion at the end of 1996 to $62.78 trillion 
at the end of 2004. Four main categories of interest-rate derivative instruments are 
examined: swaps, options, forwards, and futures. Table 2 presents the notional principal 
amounts outstanding and the frequency of use of each type of interest-rate derivative by 
banks from year-end 1996 through year-end 2004. As in Table 1, data are reported for the 
entire sample of banks and for four subgroups of banks categorized by total asset size. 
Consistent with the dramatic increase in the use of derivatives in recent years, Table 2 
shows extensive participation of banks in the interest-rate derivative markets over the 
nine-year sample period. Furthermore, the rapid growth in the use of various types of 
derivative instruments has not been confined to large commercial banks; medium-size 
and small-size banks have also experienced a tremendous increase in the participation of 
derivative markets.
As shown in Table 2, during the entire sample period, the most widely used 
interest-rate derivative instrument is the swap. At the end of 1996, 31.6 percent of banks 
report using interest-rate swaps. By the end of 2004, the percentage using swaps rise to 
37.3 percent. Over the nine-year sample period, more than 95 percent of banks with total 
assets exceeding $10 billion report using interest-rate swaps.
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Table 1 Lending Activity Based on Year-end D ata Beginning with 1996 Through 2004 for 
FDIC-insured Com mercial Banks with Total A ssets G reater than $300 M illion
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Panel A: All Banks
Average Total Assets (TA) 
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets 




























Panel B: Total Assets < $500 million
Average Total Assets 
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets 




























Panel C: $500 million < Total Assets < $1 
billion
Average Total Assets 
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets 




























Panel D: $1 billion < Total Assets < $10 
billion
Average Total Assets 
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets 




























Panel E: Total Assets > $10 billion
Average Total Assets 
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets 









































Table 2 The Use o f  Derivatives Based on Y ear-end D ata Beginning with 1996 Through 2004 for 
FD IC-insured Com m ercial Banks w ith Total Assets G reater than $300 M illion
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P anel A: All B anks
Users o f  Swaps (%) 31.57 35.08 34.47 34.27 32.72 31.86 33.14 39.03 37.26
Average Ratio to Total Assets a 0.3084 0.3341 0.4316 0.4542 0.5307 0.4822 0.4982 0.5636 0.5812
Users o f Options (%) 16.45 19.19 19.64 19.79 19.60 16.22 15.52 14.08 13.49
Average Ratio to Total Assets b 0.1066 0.1058 0.1426 0.1471 0.1412 0.1312 0.1520 0.2197 0.2232
Users o f Forwards (%) 9.02 12.22 11.13 11.82 11.63 13.19 16.48 19.32 22.06
Average Ratio to Total Assets c 0.1926 0.1342 0.2017 0.1584 0.1598 0.1502 0.1552 0.0931 0.0717
Users o f Futures (%) 5.28 5.13 5.36 5.47 4.65 5.53 5.75 6.24 6.85
Average Ratio to Total Assets d 0.4291 0.3288 0.4283 0.2965 0.3225 0.4598 0.3854 0.4022 0.2151
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%) 3.18 3.42 3.02 3.40 2.99 3.92 4.02 4.02 4.28
Number o f  Observations 942 818 728 677 602 561 522 497 467
Panel B: T o tal Assets < $500 million
Users o f Swaps (%) 7.38 7.78 8.02 10.32 8.91 7.02 10.80 13.53 15.23
Average Ratio to Total Assets a 0.1238 0.0945 0.0778 0.1020 0.0540 0.0618 0.0740 0.0726 0.0620
Users o f Options (%) 2.73 3.89 4.35 4.80 4.45 5.26 2.35 2.46 1.52
Average Ratio to Total Assets b 0.0952 0.0967 0.0885 0.0972 0.0972 0.0932 0.0313 0.0248 0.0165
Users o f Forwards (%) 0.43 1.50 1.34 1.85 2.43 3.51 10.37 10.14 11.17
Average Ratio to Total Assets c 0.0270 0.010 0.0288 0.0175 0.0147 0.0412 0.0565 0.0124 0.0096
Users o f Futures (%) 0.55 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.47 0.97 1.02
Average Ratio to Total Assets d 0.3739 0.0505 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0333 0.0352 0.0383 0.0384
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number o f  Observations 366 334 299 271 247 228 213 207 197
Panel C: $500 m illion < T otal Assets < $1 billion
Users o f Swaps (%) 19.39 18.27 19.45 21.02 18.71 17.81 22.96 29.10 31.00
Average Ratio to Total Assets a 0.1327 0.1007 0.0521 0.0610 0.0729 0.0661 0.0469 0.0495 0.0621
Users o f Options (%) 7.33 9.62 11.35 10.23 11.61 5.48 3.86 3.73 3.88
Average Ratio to Total A sse tsb 0.0731 0.0624 0.0807 0.0972 0.0513 0.0304 0.0687 0.1480 0.1480
Users o f Forwards (%) 1.42 6.73 5.95 3.98 5.81 8.22 13.33 16.42 22.48
Average Ratio to Total Assets c 0.0160 0.0190 0.0391 0.0296 0.0296 0.0558 0.0581 0.0306 0.0240
Users o f  Futures (%) 0.00 0.48 0.67 1.14 1.29 2.05 1.48 1.49 2.33
Average Ratio to Total Assets d 0.00 0.0201 0.0057 0.0302 0.0301 0.0308 0.0508 0.0707 0.0247
Users o f  swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.75 1.55
Number o f  Observations 232 208 185 176 155 146 135 134 129
a The average ratio o f total assets equals the ratio o f the notional principal amount o f  outstanding swaps to total assets for banks reporting the use o f  swaps. 
b The average ratio o f  total assets equals the ratio o f  the notional principal amount o f outstanding options to total assets for banks reporting the use o f  options. 
c The average ratio o f total assets equals the ratio o f the notional principal amount o f  outstanding forwards to total assets for banks reporting the use o f  forwards. 














Table 2 (Continued) The Use o f  Derivatives Based on Y ear-end D ata Beginning with 1996 Through 2004 for 
FDIC-insured Com m ercial Banks w ith Total Assets G reater than $300 M illion
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Panel D: $1 billion < Total Assets < $10 billion
Users o f  Swaps (%) 56.58 53.09 57.57 65.59 65.41 57.62 60.00 62.29 65.74
Average Ratio to Total Assets a 0.1226 0.1245 0.1151 0.1037 0.0821 0.0991 0.0969 0.0990 0.1158
Users o f  Options (%) 25.62 34.51 33.84 33.87 35.22 25.83 26.43 24.59 22.22
Average Ratio to Total Assets b 0.0620 0.0460 0.0503 0.0602 0.0594 0.0685 0.0460 0.0641 0.1062
Users o f  Forwards (%) 13.52 19.47 17.68 19.89 18.24 19.21 20.00 24.59 27.78
Average Ratio to Total A sse tsc 0.0290 0.0194 0.0468 0.0178 0.0199 0.0712 0.0753 0.0341 0.0536
Users o f  Futures (%) 5.69 6.19 7.03 6.99 5.66 5.96 6.43 7.38 7.41
Average Ratio to Total Assets d 0.3500 0.2220 0.1831 0.1352 0.0673 0.1044 0.1086 0.0909 0.0217
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%) 2.14 2.65 1.52 3.23 2.52 3.97 2.86 2.46 2.78
Number o f Observations 281 226 198 186 159 151 140 122 108
Panel E: Total Assets > $10 billion
Users o f Swaps (%) 96.82 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average Ratio to Total Assets a 0.9196 1.1207 1.6920 1.7834 1.9616 2.3357 2.0354 2.6250 2.570
Users o f  Options (%) 88.89 92.00 91.30 90.91 87.80 88.89 91.18 91.18 93.94
Average Ratio to Total Assets b 0.1762 0.2285 0.3375 0.3433 0.3294 0.2610 0.3196 0.3889 0.3460
Users o f Forwards (%) 66.67 74.00 67.39 70.45 63.41 69.44 76.47 67.65 66.67
Average Ratio to Total Assets c 0.3614 0.3313 0.4568 0.3780 0.3945 0.3221 0.3617 0.3033 0.2215
Users o f  Futures (%) 50.79 52.00 52.17 50.00 43.90 50.00 52.94 52.94 57.58
Average Ratio to Total Assets d 0.4721 0.4088 0.5964 0.4161 0.4630 0.4209 0.4883 0.5403 0.4493
Users o f  swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%) 38.10 44.00 41.30 38.64 34.15 44.44 47.06 47.06 45.5
Number o f Observations 63 50 46 44 41 36 34 34 33
a The average ratio o f total assets equals the ratio o f the notional 
b The average ratio o f  total assets equals the ratio o f  the notional 
c The average ratio o f  total assets equals the ratio o f the notional 
d The average ratio o f total assets equals the ratio o f the notional
principal amount o f outstanding swaps to total assets for banks reporting the use o f swaps, 
principal amount o f  outstanding options to total assets for banks reporting the use o f  options, 
principal amount o f  outstanding forwards to total assets for banks reporting the use o f  forwards, 
principal amount o f  outstanding futures to total assets for banks reporting the use o f  futures.
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Another notable increase occurred in the forward-rate agreement (FRA) usage. 
FRA is a contract that determines the rate of interest, or currency exchange rate, to be 
paid or received on an obligation beginning at some future date. At the end of 1996, 9.02 
percent of the sample banks report using FRAs. By the end of 2004, the percentage using 
FRAs more than doubled. While the percentage of banks participating in the swaps and 
forwards increased over the sample period, the proportion of banks using interest-rate 
options fell. This decline is most notable between year-end 2000 and year-end 2004. 
With the exception of banks with total assets greater than $10 billion, less than 7.5 
percent of banks report having open positions in interest-rate futures.
Finally, less than 3 percent of the sample banks report having open positions in 
interest-rate swaps, interest-rate options, interest-rate forwards, and interest-rate futures. 
In contrast, nearly half of the banks with total assets greater than $10 billion report 
having positions in all four types of interest-rate derivative instruments. This result 
strongly suggests that large banking organizations are much more likely than small 
banking organization to use derivatives. As shown in Panel E of Table 2, approximately 
25 of the largest banks heavily participated in the interest-rate derivative market, a result 
similar to the finding of Carter and Sinkey (1998).
Specifications of Variables
Based on the literature regarding the determinants of bank lending, this section 
describes the specification for intermediation, the independent variables used in the 
empirical model, and the measure of derivative activities.
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The Specification for Intermediation
The foundation of the empirical analysis in this article is the specification for 
bank lending by Sharpe and Acharya (1992). They regress a measure of lending activity 
on a set of possible supply and demand factors ( X jt_}).  Brewer, Minton, and Moser
(2000), who studied an earlier sample of commercial banks for the period June 30, 1985, 
through the end of 1992, extended the specification by adding a measure of participation 
in interest-rate derivative markets ( DERIVj t ) into the equation. Following Sharpe and 
Acharya (1992), I use the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last period’s total 
assets ( CILGAj,) as the dependent variable. In order to examine the relationship between
the growth in bank C&I loans and the banks’ participation in interest-rate derivative 
markets, I also include various measures of participation in interest-rate derivative 
markets ( DERIVj t ) in the following regression specification:
CILGAj t = f ( X j l_ v  DERIVj,) (1)
Independent Variables (Traditional 
Supply and Demand Factors)
The explanatory variables represent both supply and demand factors (X ] ( l) .
Based on the literature on the determinants of bank lending, I determine how these supply 
and demand factors enter into the regression specification. First, Bemanke and Lown 
(1991) and Sharpe and Acharya (1992), among others,2 relate overall loan growth to 
capital requirements. In addition, Sharpe (1995) finds that there is a positive association 
between bank capital and loan growth. In a more recent work, Beatty and Gron (2001)
2
Examples o f  this literature also include Hall (1993), Berger and Udell (1994), Haubrich and 
W achtel (1993), H ancock and W ilcox (1994), Brinkman and H orvitz (1995), and Peek and Rosengren 
(1995).
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document that, consistent with Sharpe’s finding, banks with higher capital growth 
relative to assets experience greater increases in their loan portfolios, and banks with 
weak capital positions are less able to increase their loan portfolios due to capital 
constraints. When a bank’s capital falls short of the required amount, the bank could 
attempt to raise the capital-to-asset ratio by reducing its assets (the denominator of the 
ratio) rather than raising capital (the numerator of the ratio). One way of doing this is to 
shift the asset portfolio away from lending, such as cutting back its investment in C&I 
loans. Banks may choose this strategy over equity issuance simply because issuing equity 
is costly.3 Therefore, undercapitalized banks are less able to increase their loan portfolios 
while satisfying the regulatory capital requirements. In contrast, banks with stronger 
capital positions have more room to expand their loan portfolios and still be able to 
satisfy the regulatory requirement for the capital-to-asset ratio. If capital-constrained 
banks adjust their lending to meet some predetermined target capital-to-asset ratios, one 
would expect a positive relationship between a bank’s capital-to-asset ratio and C&I loan 
growth. In order to control for the effect of capital requirements on C&I lending activity, 
a measure of the bank’s capital-to-asset ratio (CARATIO) is included in the empirical 
specification for C&I loan growth. CARATIO is measured as the ratio of a bank’s total 
equity capital to total assets at time t-1.
Another factor found to affect loan growth is the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
Following Sharpe and Acharya (1992), I use C&I loan charge-offs (CILCOFA) as a
3
For example, Stein (1998), among others, shows that asym m etric inform ation between investors 
and a bank causes adverse selection problem s that make issuing new equity costly.
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proxy for loan quality.4 The variable CILCOFA is constructed as the ratio of C&I loan 
charge-offs in the last period (t-1) to total assets in the last period (t-1). Charge-offs 
usually rise during a recession and decline only after an economic recovery. Therefore, a 
low charge-offs ratio can also be a signal of a favorable economic environment in a 
bank’s geographic region of operations. In addition, the ratio of C&I loan charge-offs to 
total assets could capture the impact of regulatory pressures on loan growth because 
regulators often apply pressure to banks to increase their rates of charge-offs. For 
example, capital-constrained banks may be required to increase their rates of charge-offs 
so that they can clear the regulatory hurdle for capital ratios by eliminating some of their 
assets.5 Therefore, the ratio of C&I loan charge-offs to total assets could reflect the 
impact of regulatory pressures on banks’ capital management. Each of these reasons 
suggests that those banks with high charge-offs should, other things being equal, be 
viewed as less well capitalized than banks with low charge-offs, and are therefore less 
able to increase their loan portfolios due to capital constraints. For these reasons, one 
would expect CILCOFA to have a negative association with C&I loan growth.
The relationship between bank health and regional economic conditions is another 
factor to consider. The idea that regional economic performance affects bank health is 
intuitive and broadly consistent with the aggregate banking data.6 Avery and Gordy
4
Another m easure o f  loan quality is the provision for loan losses. The reason that charge-offs is 
used instead o f  provision for loan losses is because the loan charge-offs variable also captures the impact o f 
regulatory influence.
5Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999), am ong others, find evidence 
that regulatory capital and earnings outcomes influence m anagers’ discretion in charge-offs, loan loss 
provisions, and m iscellaneous gains.
6For example, Daly, Krainer, and Lopez (2003) show that there is a significant trackable link 
between regional econom ic perform ance and bank health. Also, Berger, Bonim e, Covitz, and Hancock
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(1998) find that one-half of the change in bank loan performance from 1984 to 1995 can 
be explained with a group of state-level economic variables. Also, Bemanke and Lown 
(1991) and Williams-Stanton (1996) point out that regional economic conditions should 
influence bank C&I loan growth. The intuition is that banks in states with weak economic 
conditions are likely to have fewer profitable opportunities than banks in states with 
stronger economies. The state employment growth rate ( EMPGj ) is included in the
model as a proxy for local economic conditions that are not captured by the other 
explanatory variables.7 If state employment growth is a proxy for economic conditions, 
one would expect EMPG to be positively related to C&I loan growth, other things being 
equal.
Measure of Derivative Activities
In order to capture the effects of derivative usage on bank-loan growth, I include 
various measures of participation in interest-rate derivative markets ( DERIVj t ) in the
C&I loan growth specification (the construction of this variable is presented in equation 
2). The coefficient estimate on DERIV reflects the impact of derivative usage conditional 
on adequately incorporating the intermediating process in the remaining terms of the 
specification. Modem theories of the intermediary role of banks describe how derivative 
contracting and lending can be complementary activities. Diamond (1984) develops a 
theory of financial intermediation. In his model, banks optimally offer debt contracts to 
“depositors” and accept debt contracts from “entrepreneurs.” Depositors delegate 
monitoring activities to banks that have the ability to economize the costs of monitoring
(2000) docum ent that aggregate state-level and regional-level variables are im portant contributors to the 
persistence in firm -level perform ance (i.e., return on assets) observed in the U.S. banking industry.
7See Calom iris and M ason (2000), Avery and Gordy (1998), and Berger et al. (2000).
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loan contracts made with entrepreneurs. However, banks face an incentive problem that 
originates from the cost of delegated monitoring on behalf of their depositors. Diamond 
shows that diversification within a bank lowers the cost of delegated monitoring. An 
implication of his model is that banks should not assume any nondiversifiable risks 
unless they have special advantages in managing them. Thus in his model, banks find it 
optimal to hedge all interest-rate risk by interest-rate derivatives.8 However, even after 
diversifying, banks may still face systematic risks that cannot be diversified away.
Diamond demonstrates that derivative contracts can serve as a third form of 
contracting, which enables banks to reduce their exposure to systematic risk in their loan 
portfolios. This use of derivative contracts to hedge systematic risks enables banks to 
obtain further reductions in delegation costs, and, in turn, allows banks to intermediate 
more effectively. Empirically, Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) find that there is a 
negative correlation between risk and derivative usage for savings and loan institutions. 
In fact, they find that S&Ls that use derivatives experience relatively greater growth in 
their fixed-rate mortgage portfolios. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) examine the 
relationship between lending and derivative usage for an earlier sample of FDIC-insured 
commercial banks. Their results indicate that banks using interest-rate derivatives, on 
average, experience significantly higher growth in their C&I loan portfolios. These 
results are consistent with the notion that derivative usage would help banks better cope 
with interest-rate risk and thereby enable them to hold more loans to earn more income 
from their lending activity. If interest-rate derivative activity complements the lending
8See Pum anandam  (2004).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
activity as predicted by Diamond’s (1984) model, one would expect a positive coefficient 
estimate on the DERIV variable.
In this essay, a downward trend in C&I lending during the economic recession 
beginning in March of 2001 is observed. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) also 
document a similar pattern regarding C&I lending over a sample period from 1985 to 
1992, a period during which the economy experienced a significant cyclical downturn. 
They argue that the downward trend in lending activity and the concurrent increase in the 
use of interest-rate derivatives suggest that derivative usage might be a substitute for 
lending activity. They suggest that a negative relationship between derivative usage and 
lending activity could arise in two cases. The first case is when banks use derivatives for 
speculative purposes. Gain from speculating on interest-rate changes would enhance 
revenues from bank trading desks. The second instance is when banks charge a fee as 
over-the-counter dealers for placing derivative positions. Pursuit of either of these 
activities as a replacement for the traditional lending activities of banks would imply that 
derivative activity would be a substitute for lending activity. If these activities were 
substitutes, one would expect a negative coefficient on the DERIV variable.
From the above discussion, a specification for Equation (2) can be written as 
follows:
CILGA,, = « „ + £  a,D, + P£ARATIOjt_, + PfILCOFA,
2 (2 )
+P3EMPGJt_l +pADERIVJI+sjl 
In Equation (2), CILGAJ t is measured as the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last 
period’s total assets. Dt is a time-indicator variable equal to one for period t, or zero 
otherwise. The variable CARATIOj is the ratio of a bank’s total equity capital to total
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assets in the previous period (t-1). CILCOFA. is the ratio of C&I loan charge-offs in the 
previous period (t-1) to total assets in the previous period (t-1). EMPGJ is the state 
employment growth rate relative to last period (t-1), where EMP equals total employment 
in the state in which the bank’s headquarters are located. The variable DERIVjt is a
measure of participation in interest-rate derivative markets.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation of 
Equation (2). The mean of quarter-to-quarter changes in C&I loans scaled by values of 
beginning-of-quarter total assets is 0.4 percent over the full sample period. During this 
period, the average capital-to-asset ratio is 9.45 percent, the average C&I loan charge- 
offs over assets is 0.05 percent, and the average state employment growth rate is 0.45 
percent. Consistent with the data presented in Table 2, 20.78 percent of the sample banks 
reported using interest-rate swaps during the sample period, 11.26 percent of the sample 
banks reported using interest-rate options, and 8.61 percent reported using FRAs. Only 
3.28 percent of the sample banks reported using interest-rate futures. Finally, over-the- 
counter dealers and subsidiaries of foreign banks comprise only 1.2 percent and 4.5 
percent, respectively, of the sample bank observations.
Instrumental Variable
Examining the relationship between the C&I loan growth and derivative usage 
poses a potential endogeneity problem because the derivative-use decision and lending 
choices may be made simultaneously. As the data show, the decisions could be made 
jointly since a bank’s C&I lending activity might affect its decision to use derivatives. To 
address this problem, an instrumental-variable approach is used.
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Variable Mnemonic Mean Standard
Deviation
Observations
Dependent variable and supply and demand factors 
Dependent variable 
C&I Loan Growth over total assets CILGA 0.004 0.0525 293568
Supply and demand factors 
Capital to asset ratio 



















Additional supply and demand factors used in robustness tests 
Lagged dependent variable 
Unused credit lines to total assets
Defined Above 





Options (0-Yes, 1-No) 
Derivatives Dealer (0-No, 1-Yes) 

























“Means and standard deviations for all variables are used in the empirical analyses. The statistics are computed over the period 
from March 1996 through Decem ber 2004.
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The probit specification for the instrumental variable is based on Kim and 
Koppenhaver (1992).9 This probit specification includes the log of bank assets, the 
capital-to-asset ratio, net interest margin, and the first lag of the dependent variable. 
Commercial bank size as measured by the logarithm of its total assets is included to 
control for the differences in derivative use that might be caused by differences in the 
types of businesses and customers at large and small banks.10 The capital-to-asset ratio is 
included in the probit specification because a bank’s capital adequacy is a necessary 
condition for its participation in the derivative market. A bank’s net interest margin enters 
into the equation because banks can use derivatives to lock-in the spread between interest 
income and interest expense. Since derivative use at time t is usually dependent on 
derivative use at time t-1, the first lag of the dependent variable is included to take into 
account the dependence over time. To determine the probability of a bank’s derivative 
usage, the above probit specification for each sample date t is estimated, and then the 
estimated probability from the first-stage estimation is used as an instrument for 
derivative activity in the second-stage estimation.11 The results of this first-stage 
regression are presented in Appendix A. Overall, the probit results show that, as 
predicted, bank size, capital-to-asset ratio, and the lagged dependent variable play a 
significant role in determining the probability of derivative usage by U.S. commercial 
banks.
9
Brewer, M inton, and M oser (2000) use a sim ilar probit specification in their study.
10Previous literature finds that size is an im portant indicator in a bank’s derivative activities; e.g., 
Sinkey and Carter (1997), Kim and Koppenhaver (1992), and Gunther and Siems (1996).
11A Hausm an test indicates that the instrumental variable is a valid instrument.
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Since banks’ use of derivatives increases during the sample period, a pooled
12cross-sectional time-series regression is employed to incorporate this dynamic effect. 
Specifically, I run a cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares regression with C&I loan 
growth as the dependent variable and then report the time-series means of the parameter 
estimates and their corresponding t-statistics. The t-values are computed using Newey- 
West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. I use the predicted 
derivative use, obtained from the probit specification, to instrument the actual derivative- 
use variable as an independent variable.
Empirical Results
Using the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last period’s total assets as the 
dependent variable, I utilize Equation (2) to examine the determinants of C&I lending 
and the impact of derivatives on C&I lending activity. Table 4 reports the results of 
pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions using quarterly data from March 1996 
through December 2004.
Regression (1) of Table 4 is the reduced form of the supply equation that 
examines the impact of fundamental factors on C&I lending activity. This regression 
serves as a base for examining the relationship between derivative activity and C&I 
lending. In regression (1), C&I loan growth is significantly and positively related to the 
beginning-of-period CARATIO. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that capital- 
constrained banks adjust their loan portfolios in subsequent periods to meet some 
predetermined target capital-to-asset ratios. Similar to Brewer, Minton, and Moser 
(2000), I also find a significant, negative association between CILCOFA and C&I loan
12A ppendix B provides the coefficient on the tim e-period indication variables.
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Table 4 Univariate M ultiple Regression Coefficient Estim ates for the D eterm inants o f  Quarterly Changes 
in C& I Loans Relative to Last Period’s Total Assets a’b
Independent variables Regression (1) Regression (2 ) Regression (3) Regression (4)
CARATIO 0.1037 0.1041 0.1042 0.0791
(3.48) *** (3.47) **’ (3.47) *** (2.16) **
CILCOFA -0.8336 -0.8569 -0.8603 -0.8124
(-3.65)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.79) *** (-3.55)***
EMPG 0.0046 0.0045 0.0045 0.0103











































OBSERVATIONS 232096 232096 232096 223881
ADJ R-SQUARE 0.00566 0.00416 0.00424 0.00573
“All regression equations contain time-period indicator variables. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using Newey- 
West heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one (10%), two (5%), 
or three (1%) stars. The sample contains 36 quarters of observations from 1996 Q1 through 2004 Q4. The dependent variable for all 
regressions is the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last period’s total assets.
b CARATIO is measured as the ratio of total equity capital to total assets at time t-1. CILCOFA is measured as the ratio o f C&I loan 
charge-offs in period t-1 to total assets in period t-1. EMPG is the state employment growth rate, where EMP equals the total 
employment in the state in which the bank’s headquarters are located. DERIV, SWAPS, OPTIONS, FORWARDS, and FUTURES are 
instrumental variables obtained from a probit specification for participation in the indicated derivative markets. OF, OS, OW, FS, 
FW, SW, OFS, OFW, FSW, SWO, and OFSW are eleven possible interactions between each type o f derivative instruments. Among 
these interaction terms, O stands for option, F stands for futures, S stands for swaps, and W stands for forwards. DEALER is a binary 
variable, which equals to one if  the institution is listed as an IDSA member, or zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a binary variable, which 
equals to one if the institution is a foreign-owned institution, or zero otherwise. LAGGED CILGA is the first lag of the dependent 
variable. UNLC is unused lines of credit to total assets.
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growth. This negative relationship is consistent with the notion that the charge-offs 
variable captures the impact of regulatory pressures, a strong economic environment, or 
both. The previous period’s state employment growth variable EMPG fails to enter the 
equation significantly. This result is inconsistent with Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), 
who study a sample of banks that predates the advent of interstate banking. During the 
course of the 1990s, deregulation in the banking industry led to consolidation and to 
banks’ geographic expansion. As a result, U.S. banks have also become more 
geographically diversified. In fact, the regression results might suggest that state 
economies play a lesser role in affecting banks’ health and performance following the full 
expansion of interstate banking.
Regressions (2) and (3) include different measures of derivative activity. 
Regression (2) augments the predicted probability of derivative usage in any type of 
interest-rate derivative contract (DERIV). Regression (3) decomposes the DERIV 
variable into four types of interest-rate derivative instruments: SWAPS, OPTIONS, 
FORWARDS, and FUTURES. Each type of derivative activity is estimated using the 
probit specification discussed earlier in this section. The estimates generated in the probit 
specification are then used in conjunction with the supply and demand factors in the 
second-stage regression to predict C&I loan growth.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 report the estimation results for the derivative- 
augmented regressions. First, the coefficient estimates on CARATIO, CILCOFA, and 
EMPG are qualitatively similar to those in the base model. Second, the CARATIO and 
CILCOFA coefficient estimates remain statistically significant.
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Regression (2) of Table 4 shows that banks using any type of interest-rate 
derivative, on average, experience significantly higher growth in their C&I loan 
portfolios.13 This positive relationship between derivatives use and C&I loan growth is 
consistent with Diamond’s (1984) model of financial intermediation. In that model, 
Diamond argues that interest-rate derivatives allow commercial banks to lessen their 
systematic exposure to changes in interest rates. In addition, interest-rate derivatives 
create extra risk tolerance, enabling banks to provide more C&I loans without increasing 
the total risk level faced by the banks. Furthermore, a positive and significant coefficient 
estimate on the DERIV variable indicates that the net effect of derivative use on C&I 
lending activity is complementary. That is, the complementary effect dominates any 
substitution effect.
The regression reported in column (3) of Table 4 examines the relative role 
played by each type of derivative instrument in explaining C&I loan growth. Since banks 
that invest in the human capital and internal control systems necessary to be active in the 
market for derivatives are more likely to use more than one type of derivative,14 I also 
control for the effect of eleven possible interactions between each type of derivative 
activity in the regression.15 The results show that the coefficient estimates on all four 
kinds of derivative variables are positive. The coefficient estimates on OPTIONS, 
FORWARDS, and FUTURES are statistically significant. These results suggest that the
13
W hen the actual derivative use rather than the predicted derivative use is included in the C&I 
loan growth specification, the coefficient estimate (not reported) on DERIV is positive and marginally 
significant at the 10% level. The actual derivatives-use indicator variable is a binary variable equal one if  a 
bank engages in any interest-rate derivative activity, or zero otherwise.
14See Carter and Sinkey (1998).
15See Table 4 for a detailed breakdown o f  interaction terms.
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use of these three types (Options, Forwards, and Futures) of derivatives is significantly 
associated with higher C&I loan growth. Further, except for the interaction between 
options and futures, none of the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between 
each type of derivative activity is significant.16 Overall, my results suggest that aggregate 
use of derivative instruments, in particular interest-rate options, interest-rate futures, and 
interest-rate forwards, is associated with higher growth rates in C&I loans.
Robustness Check
To check the validity of the regression results, I augment the regression (2) 
specification by adding variables measuring other characteristics of financial institutions 
that may explain lending activity during the sample period. The augmented regression 
reported in column (4) of Table 4 addresses the concern of omitting important variables 
that might alter the observed positive relationship between lending activity and 
participation in interest-rate derivatives.
First, the lagged dependent variable (LAGGED CILGA) is included in the 
regression to account for the possibility that the derivative-participation variable is a 
proxy for growth potential. I also include a control for a foreign-firm effect by 
introducing a binary variable equal to one if a bank is a subsidiary of a foreign financial 
institution (FOREIGN), or zero otherwise. Previous literature suggests that the operation
1 7of foreign-owned banks helps to fund U.S. operations of foreign industrial firms. 
Therefore, foreign-owned banks may be expected to provide both loans and interest-rate
16W ithout the interaction term s, the coefficient estim ates (not reported) on all four kinds o f
derivative instruments have a positive sign, and the estimates on options and forw ards are statistically
significant.
17
For example, see Bhattacharaya (1993).
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derivatives to their customers, inducing a positive coefficient. On the other hand, foreign- 
owned banks also have some disadvantages due to problems in managing from a distance
1 Rand coping with multiple economic/regulatory environment. These disadvantages may 
cause foreign-owned banks to experience slower growth in their loan portfolios, other 
things being equal.
In consideration of the possibility of a spurious relationship between C&I loan 
growth and dealer activity performed by large banks that are heavily involved in 
derivative contracting, a binary variable is included in the regression to control for 
membership in the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The binary 
variable DEALER equals one if a bank is identified as a dealer by the ISDA membership 
list,19 or zero otherwise.
Finally, the ratio of the dollar value of any unused lines of credit (UNLC) to total 
assets is included as a measure of risk tolerance. The risk is two-dimensional. First, 
liquidity problems may emerge as banks commit to fill larger credit lines. Second, banks’ 
off-balance-sheet exposures to credit risk may increase as they extend lines of credit to 
manage the interest-rate risk. Controls introduced for these possibilities provide a way of 
separating loan growth from risk-taking motivations.
Regression (4) incorporates the above proxies for other activities that may cloud 
the positive association between derivative activity and loan growth. As shown in column 
(4) of Table 4, the results of the study remain robust. Specifically, the coefficient on 
predicted derivative activity (DERIV) remains positive and statistically significant. In
addition, the coefficient on the foreign-bank variable (FOREIGN) is negative and highly
18
For example, see Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith (2003) and Buch (2003).
19
ISDA m em bership list is available at http://w w w.isda.org.
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significant, suggesting that foreign-owned banks experience slower growth in C&I loan 
lending activities. As Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) suggest, dealer activities 
performed by the banks could give rise to a negative relationship between derivative 
usage and lending because banks enhance their revenue by acting as over-the-counter 
(OTC) dealers and charge a fee for placing derivative positions. Consistent with their 
prediction, the coefficient on the dealer variable is negative and significant. Finally, the 
coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable is not significantly different from 
zero. The ratio of unused lines of credit to total assets, UNLC, is positive and significant, 
suggesting that the higher the risk tolerance as measured by UNLC, the greater the C&I 
loan growth.
Conclusions
Commercial banks employ different methods, including the use of interest-rate 
derivatives to manage interest-rate risks. The use of these derivative instruments by banks 
has increased tremendously in the past decade, rising from notional amounts of $27.88 
trillion at the end of December of 1996 to $62.78 trillion at the end of 2004. The 
relationship between derivative usage and lending activity has been studied in related 
literature in recent years. This essay addresses the question of whether derivative usage 
complements or substitutes for the lending activity, investigates the relationship between 
bank participation in derivative contracting and bank lending for the period of March 31, 
1996, through December 31, 2004.
Overall, this essay (Chapter 2) documents a direct relationship between derivative 
usage by U.S. banks and growth in their commercial and industrial loan portfolios. More 
specifically, I find that aggregate use of derivative instruments, in particular interest-rate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
options, interest-rate futures, and interest-rate forwards, is associated with higher growth 
rates in C&I loans. These findings are consistent with the results of an earlier study by 
Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), who examine the relationship between lending and 
derivative usage for a sample of FDIC-insured commercial banks between 1985 and 1992. 
This documented positive association is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis 
that derivative contracting and lending are complementary activities. Diamond’s model 
predicts that banks can reduce the cost of delegated monitoring by holding a diversified 
portfolio. Engaging in derivative activities helps banks reduce the cost of monitoring 
contracts issued to their loan customers, thereby enabling banks to increase their lending 
activities without increasing the total risk level faced by the banks.
In addition, these results suggest that C&I loan growth has a significant positive 
relationship with the capital ratio. These results are consistent with the previous banking 
research in that banks with stronger capital are more able to increase their loan portfolios. 
I also document a negative relationship between C&I loan charge-offs and C&I loan 
growth. This negative association is in line with the notion that the charge-offs variable 
captures the impact of regulatory pressures or a strong economic environment, or both. 
Further, the main results are confirmed after a robustness check.
Finally, the sample shows that less than 3 percent of the sample banks report 
having open positions in all four kinds of interest-rate derivative instruments. In contrast, 
nearly half of the banks with total assets greater than $10 billion report having positions 
in all four kinds of interest-rate derivative instruments. This result strongly suggests that 
large banking organizations are much more likely than small banking organizations to 
fully utilize derivatives.
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CHAPTER 3
USE OF INTEREST-RATE DERIVATIVES AND 
BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
INTEREST-RATE RISK
Introduction
One of the most important forms of risk that banks face as financial 
intermediaries is interest-rate risk. Interest-rate risk arises from mismatches in the rate 
sensitivity of the bank’s inflows and outflows. A special function of a financial institution 
is asset transformation, which involves buying primary securities or assets (such as 
mortgages, loans, and securities) and issuing secondary securities or liabilities (such as 
certificates of deposit and federal funds borrowing) to fund asset purchases. Inflows from 
assets often have maturity and liquidity characteristics different from outflows from 
liabilities. Financial institutions potentially expose themselves to interest-rate risk in 
mismatching the maturities of assets and liabilities.
The interest-rate risk is the risk that a bank’s income and/or market value will be 
adversely affected by changes in interest rates. In addition to potential refinancing or 
reinvestment problems that occur when interest rates change, a bank faces market-value 
risk as well. For example, mismatching maturities by holding longer-term assets than
33
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liabilities means that when interest rates rise, the market value of the bank’s assets falls 
by a greater amount than its liabilities. This mismatching of maturities exposes the bank 
to the risk of economic loss and, potentially, the risk of insolvency.
Managing Interest-rate Risk
Commercial banks manage interest-rate risk using two major techniques. One is 
to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities as closely as possible (on-balance- 
sheet technique); the other technique is to use interest-rate derivatives (off-balance-sheet 
technique).
Traditionally, banks use maturity gaps to predict how their net interest margin, or 
accounting earnings, would be affected by changes in market interest rates. If the changes 
in revenue from assets perfectly match the changes in expense from liabilities, then a rise 
or fall in interest rates will have an equal and offsetting effect on both sides of the 
balance sheet. In principle, perfect matching leaves a bank’s earnings or market value 
unaffected by changes in interest rates. Flannery and James (1984) provide evidence on 
the importance of the maturity gap by examining the relationship between the interest- 
rate sensitivity of common stock returns and the maturity gap between interest-rate- 
sensitive assets and liabilities. In the financial institution industry, a commonly used 
measure of on-balance-sheet maturity composition is an institution’s one-year maturity 
gap. This measure reflects the short-term maturity mismatch of the institution’s assets and 
liabilities (Schrand, 1997).
Since the 1980s, derivative instruments have become an increasingly important 
product used by banking institutions to manage their interest-rate risk exposure. The rise 
in derivative usage arises from the fact that derivatives provide a relatively inexpensive
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means for banks to change their interest-rate risk exposure. In theory, the existence of an 
active derivative market should increase the potential for banking firms to attain their 
desired level of interest-rate risk exposure. Diamond (1984) develops a theory of 
financial intermediation in which banks have monitoring advantages as compared to 
small depositors. He shows that diversification within a bank lowers the cost of delegated 
monitoring and generates net benefits of intermediation services. An implication of 
Diamond’s model is that banks should not assume any nondiversifiable risk unless they 
have special advantages in monitoring them. Thus in Diamond’s model, banks find it 
optimal to hedge interest-rate risk by using interest-rate derivatives.
Previous Studies
Even though the potential for using derivative instruments in hedging interest-rate 
risk is widely recognized, the tremendous increase in the use of derivatives by banks has 
triggered regulators’ concerns as to whether banking firms have used derivatives 
primarily for hedging or for speculation. Much research focuses on the role played by 
derivatives, but there is no clear answer regarding which of these two alternatives, 
hedging or speculation, is more likely.
A major concern facing policymakers and bank regulators today is the possibility 
that the rising use of derivatives has increased the riskiness of individual banks and of the 
banking system as a whole. A number of studies have examined the relationship between 
interest-rate risk exposure and banks’ derivative usage. The evidence from previous 
studies is mixed. Sinkey and Carter (1994), Tufano and Headley (1994), and Gunther and 
Siems (1996) find a significant, negative relationship between the balance sheet “gap” 
measures of interest-rate risk exposure—the difference between assets and liabilities that
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mature or re-price within a specified time-period—and the extent of derivative usage by 
banks. These research articles have documented evidence that is consistent with the idea 
that increased use of derivatives by banks tends to result in higher levels of interest-rate 
risk exposure. Hirtle (1997) studies a sample of 139 bank holding companies and finds 
that holdings of derivatives are associated with significantly greater interest-rate exposure 
for the sample period of 1991 to 1994. These findings are consistent with the idea that the 
derivative instruments act as substitutes for on-balance-sheet sources of interest-rate risk 
exposure rather than as a hedge.
In contrast to these studies, Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) find a negative 
correlation between risk and derivative usage by savings and loan institutions. Ahmed, 
Beatty, and Takeda (1997) find that for the majority of derivative users, derivative usage 
reduces interest-rate exposure. Schrand (1997) finds that derivative activities are 
negatively associated with stock-price interest-rate sensitivity for a sample of publicly 
traded savings and loan associations (S&Ls). The results also indicate that S&Ls, on 
average, use derivatives to hedge interest-rate risk rather than to speculate. Brewer, 
Minton, and Moser (2000) evaluate an equation relating the determinants of Commercial 
and Industrial (C&I) lending and the impact of derivatives on C&I loan lending activity. 
They find that engaging in derivative activities helps banks reduce the delegation costs of 
monitoring contracts issued by their loan customers, thereby enabling banks to increase 
their lending activities without increasing the total risk level faced by the banks. Brewer, 
Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences in the financial characteristics 
of banking organizations that use derivatives relative to those that do not. They find that 
banks that use derivatives grow their business loan portfolio faster than banks that do not
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use derivatives. The first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2) investigates the 
relationship between bank participation in derivative contracting and bank lending for the 
period March 31, 1996, through December 31, 2004. I find that the aggregate use of 
derivative instruments, in particular interest-rate options, interest-rate futures, and 
interest-rate forwards, is associated with higher growth rates in C&I loans. This 
documented positive association is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that 
derivative contracting and lending are complementary activities. Minton, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2005) examine the use of credit derivatives by U.S. bank holding companies 
from 1999 to 2003. They find that credit derivatives make it easier for banks to maximize 
their value with less capital, thereby reducing the cost of loans for bank customers. Their 
results are also consistent with the prediction of hedging theories. These studies suggest 
that banks use derivatives for hedging purposes rather than substituting for traditional on- 
balance-sheet activity.
Following the lead of previous research, I test Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that 
derivative instruments allow banks to better manage their interest-rate risk exposure. 
Specifically, I examine the role of derivatives in determining the interest-rate sensitivity 
of bank holding companies’ (BHC) net worth, while controlling for the influence of on- 
balance-sheet activities and other bank-specific characteristics.
Contribution to the Literature
This essay (Chapter 3) differs from the previous literature in several aspects. First, 
it uses more recent data. Few of the previous studies covered the period from 1996 
through 2003. During this period, interest-rate derivative usage for individual banks was 
much more extensive than found in earlier studies. For example, the notional amount of
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derivative holdings by banks rose from $27.88 trillion at the end of December 1996 to 
$62.78 trillion at the end of 2004. Given the substantial increase in the use of derivatives, 
the inferences that can be drawn may be clearer than in previous research. Therefore, the 
use of more recent data in this chapter sheds more light on the effect of derivative usage 
on banks’ interest-rate risk exposure. Further, beginning with the third quarter of 1997,
the Federal Reserve’s Report of Condition and Income provides greater detail of banks’
20assets and liabilities, reporting those that are due to mature or re-price within one year. 
Therefore, construction of a maturity-gap variable will be more accurate and much more 
detailed than those used in previous studies.
Second, the sample period in this essay (Chapter 3) covers a full business cycle, 
thereby providing evidence for interest-rate changes experienced during both economic 
expansions and economic contractions. Schrand (1997) studies a sample of publicly 
traded savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and documents a universal downward trend 
of interest rates over a sample period of 1984 to 1988. Hirtle (1997), on the other hand, 
examines a sample of bank holding companies for the sample period of 1991 to 1994, a 
period during which the economy experienced increased interest rates. In contrast, the 
sample in this essay provides a more comprehensive picture regarding the impact of 
derivative usage on the interest-rate sensitivity of bank holding companies through the 
different stages of the business cycle; in particular, the different interest-rate 
environments associated with economic expansion and contraction.
Finally, previous studies shed light on the statistical relationship between 
derivative usage and banks’ interest-rate risk exposure; none, however, presents evidence
20
The increase in derivative usage also increases the im portance o f  establishing how these 
instruments are being utilized.
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on the economic significance of derivative instruments in shaping banks’ interest-rate 
exposure. The major finding in this essay is that stock returns of bank holding companies 
using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes after controlling for balance- 
sheet composition and asset size. This result is both statistically and economically 
significant. In fact, the sample results in this essay suggest that an average-size bank 
holding company would have to increase its capital by $209.37 million to shift the 
interest-rate beta down by 35 basis points, if it did not use interest-rate derivatives to 
hedge its interest-rate risk.
This essay (Chapter 3) is organized as follows: The next section describes the 
sample and data sources (Data Sources and Construction of the Maturity-gap Variable). 
A discussion of the econometric methods used then follows (Econometric Methods). 
Next, the empirical results are presented (Empirical Results) followed by robustness test 
results (Robustness Checks). The final section of this Chapter provides the conclusions 
and policy implications relevant to this essay.
Data Sources and Construction 
of the Maturity-gap Variable
This section describes the data sources used in this essay (Chapter 3) and the 
construction of the one-year maturity-gap variable. In the financial institution industry, a 
commonly used measure of on-balance-sheet maturity composition is an institution’s 
one-year maturity gap, a measure that reflects the short-term maturity mismatch of the 
institution’s assets and liabilities. Even though the one-year gap imperfectly represents
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interest-rate risk exposure, it is the best proxy for the duration of a bank holding
21company’s portfolio, given the available data.
Data Sources
The stock return data and interest-rate data as well as the balance sheet data and 
derivative data from 1998 through 2003 are obtained from the following sources:
(1) Market return data (Friday of each week) are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted indices covering the 
period from January 1998 through December 2003. Bank return data are 
obtained from CRSP.
(2) Interest-rate data (yield on the constant-maturity one-year Treasury security) 
are obtained from the FRED II database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis.
(3) The balance sheet data and derivative data are obtained from the Reports of
Condition and Income filed with the Federal Reserve System (Call Reports).
Construction of the One-year 
Maturity-gap Variable
I follow the approach of Pumanandam (2004) and construct a 12-month gap
measure (SHORT). Figure 1 shows the detailed construction of the one-year maturity-gap
variable. This measure captures the net imbalances in effective maturity (i.e., adjusted for
re-pricing terms) of the assets and liabilities of a bank over a one-year period. Beginning
with the third quarter of 1997, Call Reports filed with the Federal Reserve System
provide a detailed account of banks’ assets and liabilities that are due to mature or re-
21Duration is a superior measure o f  interest-rate risk exposure. First, duration is a m easure o f  the 
average life o f  a security because it recognizes that not all o f  the cash flow from  a typical security occurs at 
its maturity. Second, duration also expresses the elasticity o f  a security’s price relative to changes in the 
interest rate and measures a security’s responsiveness to changes in m arket in terest rates.
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price within a year. The measure used in this essay (Chapter 3) is comparable to the 
SHORT used by Flannery and James (1984) and is defined as the absolute value of assets 
maturing or re-pricing within a year minus liabilities that mature or re-price within a year 
scaled by the total assets of the bank. A one-year maturity gap is constructed as shown 
below:
Loans and Leases Due to Mature Term Deposits Due to Mature
or Re-price Within a Year or Re-price Within a Year
+ +
Securities Due to Mature or Re-price Fed Funds Borrowed
Within a Year +
+ Other Liabilities for Borrowed
Fed Funds Sold Funds
+ +
Customer's Liabilities to the Bank for Bank's Liabilities on Customer's
Outstanding Acceptance Outstanding Acceptance
Figure 1 Construction of the One-year Maturity Gap
This number, the one-year maturity gap, is scaled by the total assets of the bank in 
order to compute the one-year maturity-gap-to-asset ratio (ASHORT), since an 
appropriate scale variable is required to put the dollar measure of maturity mismatch in 
the same unit of measurement as the measure of interest-rate sensitivity.
Econometric Methods 
The foundation of the empirical analysis is the two-factor market model of 
Flannery and James (1984) who measure the interest-rate sensitivity for a sample of 
actively traded commercial banks and savings and loan associations during the period 
1976 to 1981. In the two-factor market model regression, Flannery and James relate bank 
j ’s common stock returns to the returns on the market and an interest-rate term designed
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to capture changes in interest rates. The coefficient on the interest-rate term (the interest- 
rate “beta”) can be interpreted as measuring interest-rate exposure. Based on the 
methodology developed by Flannery and James (1984), Hirtle (1997) extended the 
specification by regressing interest-rate betas on a variable that reflects the scope of 
BHCs’ participation in the interest-rate derivative market in a second-stage regression. 
The interest-rate risk measures derived from the first-stage regression can be viewed as 
the “output” of banks’ attempts to manage their interest-rate risk exposure, using the 
“inputs” of balance-sheet positions and interest-rate derivatives.
A two-stage procedure is employed in this essay. Following Flannery and James 
(1984), I first estimate the market-model regression to capture the measures of interest- 
rate sensitivity (the interest-rate “beta”). Then these interest-rate betas are regressed on a 
series of variables that reflect the composition of the BHCs’ balance sheet and the scope 
of their participation in the interest-rate derivative market.
Two-factor Model
The approach used is based on the methodology introduced by Flannery and 
James (1984). Specifically, the following equation is used to measure interest-rate 
sensitivity for each bank j :
R j t  = f i o j  + P m j R m t  +  P l j R l t  + & j t  (3)
Where
Rjt = the return of bank j ’s stock in week t.
Rmt = the return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of common stock in week t.
RIt = the weekly holding period return on a constant-maturity one-year Treasury security.
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Since the holding period returns on bonds are negatively correlated with the 
change in the level of interest rates, a positive value for /3,j implies that bank j ’s market
value declines when interest rates rise. Therefore, /?;/, the coefficient on the interest-rate
term, measures the sensitivity of the return on bank holding company (BHC) j ’s stock to 
changes in interest rates while controlling for changes in the return on the market. In that 
sense, P1} can be used to measure BHC j ’s interest-rate risk exposure. A positive interest-
rate beta implies that the value of the BHC’s equity tends to decrease when interest rates 
rise, while a negative beta implies the opposite. As specified in Equation (3) above, 
however, the interest-rate beta is only a partial measure of interest-rate risk exposure. 
Changes in the interest-rate environment may also affect the return on the market and, 
consequently, BHC equity values (Flannery and James, 1984).
In order to obtain a total measure of each BHC’s interest-rate risk exposure, the 
market return variable, Rml, is decomposed into two portions by regressing it on a
constant and RIt. The residuals from this regression capture the portion of Rmt that is 
uncorrelated with the interest-rate term Ru. By substituting these residuals for Rmt in the 
market-model equation, the coefficient on Ra in the market model will reflect both the 
direct influence of changes in interest rates on BHC equity values and the indirect 
influences working through changes in the market rate of return (Flannery and James, 
1984). Giliberto (1985) argues that such orthogonalization introduces a bias into the 
coefficient estimate and standard error for the interest-rate risk variable. Using OLS, the 
only unbiased estimator is for f3mj. Without a priori knowledge of the bias direction, one
cannot establish how the test of /?/; is affected. Therefore, the regular t-test is
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inappropriate for drawing inferences about interest-rate sensitivity. However, as Hirtle 
(1997) shows, the bias is that the resulting coefficient is an estimate of the total derivative 
of the return on the bank’s stock with respect to the interest-rate variable rather than the 
partial derivative. The total derivative is the coefficient of interest, so the “bias” 
introduced by the orthogonalization is both intentional and desired.
In this study, first-stage regressions are estimated annually between 1998 and 
2003 for each bank whose stock traded publicly for at least 30 weeks in a given calendar 
year. This process results in a separate interest-rate sensitivity beta for each bank for each 
year that the bank is in the sample.
Second-stage Regression
In the second-stage equation, the interest-rate betas derived from the first-stage 
regression are regressed on a series of variables that reflect the composition of the BHCs’ 
balance sheet and the scope of their participation in the interest-rate derivative market. 
The second-stage estimation equation is as follows:
„  _  p r io r i .  ,u e r w .Pip =  « o + Z  at°t +  (r-^rh + « 2Shorty i ^  (D eriv3 TA~)j‘ + a 2( TA }j‘ (4)
+ a 3 (In tasst) + mJt
Pijt is the interest-rate beta of bank j ’s equity. Dt is a time-indicator variable. Short
(maturity-gap measurement) is the j th bank’s average net short position; it is defined as 
the value of assets maturing or re-pricing within a year minus liabilities maturing or re­
pricing within a year. TA is the j ,h bank’s total assets. Deriv is the j th bank’s notional 
amount of interest-rate derivative instruments, tun is an error term. The intercept
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a0 captures the effects of interest-rate changes on assets and liabilities that mature or re-
22price in more than one year as well as the effects of other specification errors.
To test the hypothesis that off-balance-sheet derivative activities are negatively 
associated with the interest-rate sensitivity of stock prices after controlling for on- 
balance-sheet exposure, a measure of interest-rate derivative instruments (Deriv) is 
incorporated into regression (4). Balance-sheet and derivative data are collected from the
Deriv uJune Call Report for each bank for each year in the sample. ( )jt is the/  bank’s
notional principal amount of interest-rate derivative contracts scaled by its total assets.
Further, the logarithm of BHC asset size is included to control for differences in 
interest-rate risk exposure that might be caused by differences in the types of businesses 
and customers at large and small banks. In addition, Demsetz and Strahan (1995, 1997) 
point out that banks of different size may have different risk preferences. For example, 
large banks may choose to pursue risk-increasing activities (such as commercial and 
industrial lending) because they are equipped with greater diversification advantages as 
compared to smaller banks. Secondly, large bank holding companies may have greater 
access to markets and products (e.g., over-the-counter dealer activity, foreign deposits, 
and geographically diversified subsidiaries). These operating advantages can significantly 
change their interest-rate risk profiles as compared to their smaller counterparts. Finally, 
previous research finds that size is an important determinant of a bank’s derivative
22The exam ination o f  the conditional num ber and variance o f  inflation factors does not indicate a 
problem  w ith multicollinearity.
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activities.23 Thus, it is important to control for asset size in the regression to avoid the 
possibility of a spurious relationship between derivative activity and other size-related 
factors.
Empirical Results
The empirical results of this essay (Chapter 3) are presented in this section. Table 
5 summarizes the descriptive statistics. Table 6 presents the market-model regression 
results, and Table 7 reports the second-stage regression results. The economic 
implications of these results are also discussed in this section.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 summarizes the sample from 1998 through 2003. During the sample
period, the average maturity-gap-to-asset ratio is a negative 23 percent; the average
notional value of interest-rate derivatives over assets is 50 percent. The mean return for
the bank holding companies in the sample is 3.70 percent, and the mean return for the
value-weighted CRSP is 1.8 percent. During the sample period, 23.08 percent of the
sample banks reported using interest-rate swaps, 12.04 percent reported using interest-
rate options, and 10.68 percent reported using interest-rate forwards. Only 3.19 percent of
the sample banks reported using interest-rate futures. Finally, approximately 1 percent of
the banks in the sample are members of ISDA.
Market-model Regression and 
Interest-rate Sensitivity
The market-model regressions are estimated annually between 1998 and 2003 for 
each BHC whose stock traded publicly for at least 30 weeks in a given year. Table 6
23
For example, Sinkey and Carter (1997), Kim and Koppenhaver (1992), and Gunther and Siems 
(1996) find that size is an im portant determ inant o f  a bank’s derivative activities.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 5 Summary Statistics for the Full S am plea’b
47
Variable M nemonic M ean Standard
Deviation
Stock Return and Interest-rate Indices
B H C ’s Stock Return BHCRET 0.0037 0.0448
M arket Return VW RET 0.0018 0.0269
Interest-rate Term TREAS01 0.0025 0.1002
Balance Sheet D ata
M aturity Gap Scaled by B H C ’s Total Assets ASHORT -0.2326 3.1738
Derivative Scaled by B H C ’s Total Assets ADERIV 0.4985 3.1168
Log Total A ssets LNTASST 20.0067 2.1729
Classification Variable
Swaps (0-Yes, 1-No) DSW AP 0.2308 0.4686
Futures (0-Yes, 1-No) DFUTURES 0.0319 0.1843
Forwards (0-Yes, 1-No) DFORW ARD 0.1068 0.3390
Options (0-Yes, 1-No) DOPTION 0.1204 0.3628
Derivatives D ealer (0-No, 1-Yes) D EALER 0.0120 0.1082
a M eans and standard deviations for all variables used in the em pirical analyses. The statistics are 
com puted over the period from  1998 through 2003.
b BHCRET is a bank holding com pany’s weekly stock returns, and V W R ET is the value-weighted CRSP 
weekly returns. TREAS01 is the weekly holding-period return on a constant-m aturity one-year Treasury 
security. SHORT (m aturity-gap measurem ent) is assets that mature or re-price within a year minus 
liabilities that m ature or re-price within a year. DEALER is a  binary variable, w hich is equal to one if  the 
BHC is an ISDA m em ber, or zero otherwise.














Table 6 Aggregate M arket-m odel Annual Regressions, 1998 Through 2003
= P0 j + P„Am, +  PljRl, + £j,
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Intercept ( J3() j  ) -0.0029 -0.0033 0.0033 0.0068 0.0052 0.0019
(-7.24) *** (-7.81) *** (6.06) *** (14.23) *** (12.87) *** (5.81) ***
M arket Return ( ) 0.8670 0.4676 0.3215 0.5242 0.7089 0.7204
(57.05) *** (27.28) (20.82) *** (31.05) *** (40.26) *** (44.57) ***
Interest-rate Term  ( /3 jj ) 0.2363 0.317 0.270 0.481 -0.0908 0.475
(2.97) *** (1.85)* (1.26) (4.07) *** (-6.41) *** (4.80) ***
R-squared 0.2331 0.1669 0.1400 0.1357 0.1736 0.1980
N um ber o f  Bank H olding Com panies 215 204 201 193 178 171
R  = the weekly return o f  bank j ’s stock in week t.
R mt = the weekly return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio o f  com m on stock in week t.
Rlt =  the holding period return on a constant-m aturity one-year Treasury security. 
Statistical significance is displayed by the use o f  one (10%), two (5%), or three (1%) stars.
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Table 7 Univariate M ultiple Regression Coefficient E stim atesa,b
Independent variables R egression (1) Regression ( 2 ) Regression (3)
ADERIV -0.0072
(-2.72) ***




ASHORTD2 0.0095 0 .0 1 0 1 *** -0.0003
(3.59) *** (3.66) (-0.13)
ASHORTD3 0.0049 0.0055 -0.0048
(0.56) (0.62) (-0.62)
A SHORTD4 0.0027 0.0028 -0.0075
(0.75) (0.76) ( -1 .0 2 )
ASHORTD5 0.0076 0.0077 -0.0026
(3.01) (3.04) *** (-0.45)
A SH O R TD 6 0.0062 0.0062 -0.0041
(1.82) * (1 .87)* (-0.50)
ADERIVD1 -0.0063
(-0.39)








A D ER IV D 6 0.0014
0.01
A SHORT -0.0101 -0.0104
(-4.29) *** ( .4 .4 5 ) ***
OBSERV ATIONS 1186 1186 1186
AD J R-SQ UARE 0.0687 0.0706 0.0866
a All regression equations contain tim e-period indicator variables. T -statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated 
using N ew ey-W est heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Statistical significance is displayed by the 
use o f  one (10% ), two (5% ), o r three (1% ) stars. The sam ple contains six years o f  observations from  1998 through 
2003. The dependent variable for all regressions is the estim ates o f  interest-rate betas from  the first-stage regression.
b A D ER IV  is m easured as the ratio o f  notional am ount o f  interest-rate derivatives to total assets. ASHORT is m easured 
as the ratio o f  m aturity-gap variable to total assets. LN TO TA SST is the logarithm  o f  a bank’s total assets. 
ASHORTD1, ASH O RTD 2, A SH O R TD 3, A SH O R TD 4, ASHORTD5, and A SH O R T D 6  are six interactions between 
m aturity-gap m easurem ent and tim e-period indication variables. A D ER IV D 1, A D ER IV D 2, AD ERIV D 3, AD ERIV D4, 
A D ERIV D5, and A D ER IV D 6 are six interaction term s betw een derivative activity  m easurem ent and tim e-period 
indication variable.
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presents the yearly analysis of the market-model regressions. The regression process
produces a separate interest-rate sensitivity beta for each bank holding company for each
year that the BHC is in the sample. The average of those individual betas is positive
(0.4013), suggesting that an increase in interest rates leads to a decrease in BHC equity
values. These regressions are representative of the results across the BHCs contained in
the sample for a given year. Consistent with the findings of Hirtle (1997), there is
considerable variation across years in both the coefficients on the market return and on
the interest-rate term. In five of the six sample years, the interest-rate beta from these
cross-sectional regressions is positive and differs significantly from zero.
Estimation Results of 
Regression Model
Since banks’ use of derivatives increases during the sample period, a pooled 
cross-sectional time-series regression is employed to incorporate this dynamic effect. 
Specifically, I run a cross-sectional OLS regression with interest-rate betas as the 
dependent variable and then report the time-series means of the parameter estimates and 
their corresponding t-statistics. The t-values are computed using Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Using estimates of interest-rate 
betas from the first-stage regressions as dependent variables, I utilize Equation (4) to 
examine the impact of derivatives on bank holding companies’ stock return interest-rate 
sensitivity. Table 7 reports the results of pooled cross-sectional time-series regression 
results for the sample period 1998 through 2003.
Regression (1) of Table 7 serves as a base for examining the relationship between 
a financial institution’s stock returns’ interest-rate sensitivity and the maturity 
composition of on-balance-sheet assets and liabilities. Under the maturity-mismatch
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Short
hypothesis, the expected sign of the coefficient estimate on (------- ) is negative. The test
TA
results, consistent with Flannery and James (1984), find a significantly negative 
relationship between the measure of bank stock interest-rate sensitivity and the bank’s net 
short-asset position.
In Regression (2) of Table 7, the interest-rate betas are regressed not only on the 
on-balance-sheet activities but also on the off-balance-sheet activities approximated by 
the notional principal amount of interest-rate derivatives scaled by BHCs’ total assets 
(ADERIV). The coefficient on ADERIV reflects the impact of derivative usage 
conditional on adequately incorporating the remaining terms of the specification. In 
Diamond’s (1984) model, banks are delegated monitors having a comparative advantage 
in monitoring and enforcing loan contracts made with borrowers. Diamond shows that 
derivative instruments allow banks to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in 
interest rates. Thus, in his model, banks find it optimal to hedge all interest-rate risk using 
interest-rate derivatives. If derivative instruments allow banks to reduce their interest-rate 
risk exposure as predicted by Diamond’s (1984) model, one would expect negative 
coefficient estimates on the ADERIV variable.
As discussed in an earlier section, the logarithm of BHC asset size is included to 
control for differences in interest-rate risk exposure that might be caused by differences 
in the types of businesses and customers at large and small banks. To control for the 
effect of changes in the interest-rate environment across time on on-balance-sheet 
activity, I also introduce five possible interactions between the maturity-gap 
measurement and the time-indicator variables. Column (2) of Table 7 reports the 
estimation results for the derivative-augmented regressions. First, the coefficient
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estimates on the maturity-gap variable is qualitatively similar to that in the base model. 
Second, the ASHORT coefficient estimate remains statistically significant.
Regression (2) of Table 7 shows that the coefficient estimate on ADERIV is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that banks using interest-rate derivatives, 
on average, experience significantly lower interest-rate betas. In fact, when the data are 
evaluated at the sample means, using the results from regression (2) of Table 7, it is 
estimated that each 100 basis points increase in derivative usage results in a 35 basis 
points reduction in banks’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity.24
Normally, financial economists use the total variance of a bank’s historical stock 
returns (or its standard deviation) as a measure of overall volatility associated with the 
asset risk of a firm. If interest-rate derivative instruments enable banks to lessen their 
systematic exposure to changes in interest-rate risk, holding everything else equal, one 
would expect the variance of stock return for a bank that uses derivatives to be less than 
the variance of stock return for the same bank had it not used derivatives. Similarly, one 
would expect that the capital level required for derivative users to be less than nonusers. 
Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences in the financial 
characteristics of banking organizations that use derivatives relative to those that do not. 
They indeed find that banking organizations that use derivatives to manage interest-rate 
risk hold lower levels of (expensive) capital than do other institutions. This finding 
implies that derivative usage allows banks to substitute inexpensive risk management for 
expensive capital.
94
As shown in regression (2) o f  Table 3, the coefficient estimate on A D ER IV  is -0.0072. The 
average ADERIV is 0.4985. Therefore, when the data are evaluated at the sam ple mean, every 100 basis 
points increase in derivative usage results in a 35 basis points reduction in a b ank ’s stock return interest- 
rate sensitivity.
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To evaluate the economic significance of the results, I calculate the standard 
deviations of banking holding companies’ stock returns in each sample year. The 
standard deviations are then recalculated, assuming that these banking firms do not 
engage in interest-rate derivative activities. As shown in Table 8, the standard deviations 
of stock returns are consistently smaller for users than for nonusers. This result is in line 
with the predictions of hedging theories in that derivative instruments allow banks to 
lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest rates.
Next, the annual average market value of the stocks for bank holding companies 
is calculated, and this market value is used as the base to calculate the extra capital that a 
banking firm in the sample needed each year to hedge against the interest-rate risk. (See 
Table 8 for detailed calculations.) The results indicate that a bank holding company, on 
average, would have to use $209.37 million of capital each year to shift the interest-rate 
beta down by 35 basis points had it not used interest-rate derivatives to hedge against 
interest-rate risk. This finding is inconsistent with Hirtle (1997). Its economic 
significance provides further evidence that increased use of derivatives is associated with 
lower interest-rate sensitivity after controlling for on-balance-sheet exposure.
This negative relationship between derivative activity and bank stock return 
interest-rate sensitivity is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) model of financial 
intermediation. In that model, Diamond argues that interest-rate derivatives allow banks 
to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest rates. Similar to the findings of
25Hirtle uses the tw o-factor market model and finds that for the typical bank holding company, 
increases in the use o f  interest-rate derivatives corresponded to  greater interest-rate risk exposure during a 
sub-sample period (1991-1994).














Table 8 Risk Sensitivity o f  BHC Stock Return, 1998 Through 2003
Standard D eviation o f  BHC Stock Return
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
W ith Derivative Usage 0.002306 0.00272 0.002348 0.00263 0.002756 0.002653
W ithout D erivative Usage 0.003169 0.00334 0.002837 0.00289 0.003137 0.003396
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
M ean o f  M arket Value o f  Stock 762,264,000 812,641,000 958,502,000 988,005,000 1,137,381,000 1,167,870,000
For example, extra capital needed by sample BH Cs to hedge interest-rate risk in year 1998 = (0.003169/0.002306)*762,264,000-762,264,000 = $285.27 million. 
Similarly, the extra capital needed by sample BHCs to hedge interest-rate risk in all sam ple years is calculated. The average extra capital for all sample years 
(1998 through 2003) is $209.37 million.
Oft-t̂
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Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996), the results of this study suggest that bank holding 
companies use derivatives to hedge interest-rate risk rather than to speculate.
Robustness Checks
Overall, the results in the previous section suggest that bank stock return interest- 
rate sensitivity is negatively related to banks’ participation in the derivative market. As a 
further check on the validity of the results, I introduce five interaction terms between the 
measure of derivative activity and time-indicator variables in regression (3) of Table 7. 
Adding these variables addresses the concern that the impact of the derivative activity on 
bank holding companies’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity is driven by any particular 
time period or interest environment.26 As shown in column (3) of Table 7, none of the 
coefficient estimates on interaction terms is statistically significant, suggesting that the 
variability of interest rates during the sample period does not cloud the significant
97association between derivative activity and stock return interest-rate sensitivity.
Regressions (1), (2), and (3) in Table 7 are based on a two-stage procedure. In this 
procedure, I first estimate the market model regression to capture the measures of 
interest-rate sensitivity (the interest-rate “beta”). Then these interest-rate betas are 
regressed on a series of variables that reflect the composition of the BHCs’ balance sheets 
and the scope of their participation in the interest-rate derivative market. Balance sheet 
and derivative data are collected from the June Call Report for each bank for each year in 
the sample. As an alternative specification, I evaluate the following equation:
26
M onetary policy m ay shift over the business cycle, w hich m ay lead to  a shift in the relationship 
between bank holding com panies’ stock returns and derivative activity.
27
Equation (2) is also estim ated separately for each sample year; the results confirm  the pooled 
cross-sectional estimation.
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t Short
RJt =  a0 +  ^ laDi + a , (---------- ) jt +  a 2 D eri v D u m m y /(+ a3 D eri v ln te re s ty/
<=2 TA (5)
+ a 4S h o rtIn te re s t7, +PmjRmt + fyR,, + mjt
Equation (5) incorporates the BHC’s stock return data, BHC’s quarterly balance 
sheet data, and BHC’s quarterly interest-rate derivative data from 1998 through 2003. 
The results of the pooled cross-sectional time-series regression are also robust to the 
inclusion of the derivative-use indicator variable, which is a binary variable equaling one 
if a bank engages in any interest-rate derivative activity, or zero otherwise. Specifically, 
the interest-rate betas captured from the first-stage regression are regressed on a 
derivative-use dummy variable (DERIVDUMMY), the maturity-gap variable, the 
interactions between the maturity-gap variable and the interest-rate term 
(SHORTINTEREST), and the interactions between the derivative-use dummy and the 
interest-rate term (DERIVINTEREST).
As shown in Table 9, the coefficient estimates on DERIVINTEREST are negative 
and statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient estimates on the interest-rate term 
are positive and statistically significant. A striking feature of this second robustness 
check is that coefficient estimates on DERIVINTEREST and the interest-rate term 
balance out, suggesting that derivative users’ stock returns are insensitive to changes in 
interest rates, holding everything else equal. Once again, this result suggests that 
interest-rate derivatives allow banks to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in 
interest rates, thereby increasing the potential for banks to better manage their interest- 
rate risk exposure.
28A jo in t hypothesis test indicates that the coefficient estim ates on D ERIVIN TER EST and the 
interest-rate term  net to zero.
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Independent V ariables Regression (4)
ASHORT 0.00002
(0.82)
D ERIV D U M M Y 0.0019
(0.97)




M A RK ETRETU RN 0.8909
(16.11) ***
INTEREST TER M 0.1370
(3.27) ***
O BSERV ATIONS 2461
ADJ R -SQ U A RE 0.2116
a The multiple regression equation contains tim e-indicator variables. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) 
are calculated using N ew ey-W est heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Statistical 
significance is displayed by the use o f  one (10% ), two (5%), or three (1% ) stars. The sample contains six 
years o f  observations from  1998 through 2003. The dependent variable is the weekly return o f  bank j ’s 
stock in week t.
b ASHORT is m easured as the ratio o f  m aturity-gap variable to  total assets. M ARKETRETURN is the 
weekly return on CRSP value-weighted portfolio o f  com m on stocks in w eek t. INTEREST TERM  is the 
weekly holding period return on a constant-m aturity one-year Treasury security. DERIVDUM M Y is a 
binary variable equal to one if  a bank engages in any interest-rate derivative activity, or zero otherwise. 
DERIVINTEREST is the interaction between the derivative-use dum m y variable and the interest-rate term. 
SHORTINTEREST is the interaction between the m aturity-gap variable and the interest-rate term.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Commercial banks employ different methods, including the use of interest-rate 
derivatives to manage interest-rate risk. The use of these derivative instruments by banks 
has increased tremendously in the past decade, rising from notional amounts of $27.88 
trillion at the end of December 1996 to $62.78 trillion at the end of December 2004. The 
popularity of derivative usage is due to the fact that derivatives provide a relatively 
inexpensive means for banks to change their interest-risk exposure. In theory, the 
existence of an active derivative market should increase the potential for banks to move 
toward their desired levels of interest risk. Alan Greenspan states that complex financial 
instruments such as derivatives have contributed to the development of an efficient, 
flexible, and resilient financial system. The potential of derivative instruments has been 
widely recognized, and the question that has arisen in consequence is whether banks have 
used derivatives primarily to reduce the risks arising from their other banking activities 
(for hedging) or to achieve higher levels of interest-rate risk exposure (for speculation). If 
they use derivatives for hedging, is there a significant association between derivative 
activities and stock return interest-rate sensitivity? Using recent data that cover a full 
business cycle, this chapter revisits these questions to ascertain if a statistically 
significant relationship still exists between derivative activities and stock return interest- 
rate sensitivity.
The major finding of this essay (Chapter 3) is that stock returns of a bank holding 
company using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes, controlling for 
balance-sheet composition and asset size. This finding is consistent with the results of an 
earlier study by Schrand (1997), who studies a sample of publicly traded savings and loan
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associations (S&Ls) over a sample period from 1984 to 1988. In addition, the results in 
this essay are statistically and economically significant. In fact, the sample results suggest 
that a bank holding company, on average, would have to use $209.37 million of capital 
each year to shift the interest-rate beta down by 35 basis points if it did not use interest- 
rate derivatives to hedge against interest-rate risk. This result is consistent with 
Diamond’s (1984) prediction in which a bank can use interest-rate derivatives to hedge 
against interest-rate risk. Furthermore, the results presented in this essay (Chapter 3) also 
suggest that the restrictive policies for banks’ derivative activities have consequences in 
innovation promotion and more effective bank risk management. The possibility that the 
use of interest-rate derivative instruments is associated with lower bank holding 
companies’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity implies that restrictions on bank 
participation in financial derivatives could prevent banks from managing interest-rate risk 
more effectively.
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CHAPTER 4
DURATION OF CORPORATE 
DEBT ISSUES
Introduction
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to investigate the 
factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their debt issues. In this 
chapter, the duration of debt issues is examined. Some questions about the determinants 
of debt maturity may also be answered by examining firms’ duration choices. Duration 
measures the number of years required to recover the true cost of a bond, considering the 
present value of all coupon and principal payments received in the future. Debt maturity 
focuses more on matching the cash flow generated from the chosen project to the life of 
the project. Research comparing both approaches may discern whether firms focus on 
duration or maturity. Hypotheses that have been offered to explain corporate debt 
maturity are used to examine the firms’ duration choices to see if factors that influence 
maturity choices also affect bond duration.
Using a sample of debt issues from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum 
database, I document the determinants of the durations of 8,627 public, non-convertible 
corporate debt instruments placed in U.S. markets between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2002. I examine how signaling and asymmetric information as well as 
agency problems are related to bond duration.
60
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The primary finding is that firm quality, as measured by credit rating, is directly 
related to bond duration. I also find evidence suggesting that bond duration is inversely 
related to firm size. In addition, I find that regulated non-financial firms have longer bond 
durations and that syndicated offerings have longer durations than non-syndicated 
offerings.
This essay (Chapter 4) is organized as follows: The next section provides a 
comprehensive examination of the theories surrounding debt maturity and bond duration, 
including a set of testable hypotheses. A description of the data obtained for analysis is 
provided, and the models and results are then presented. The conclusions of this essay are 
presented in the final section of Chapter 4.
Theories and Hypotheses
Theories and hypotheses that have been offered to explain corporate debt maturity
are used to examine the firms’ duration choices to determine if factors that influence
maturity choices also affect bond duration. Specifically, I investigate how signaling and
asymmetric information as well as agency problems are related to bond duration.
Signaling and Asymmetric 
Information
Flannery (1986) examines the maturity structure of a firm’s risky debt using a 
model of uncertainty where debt serves as a signal of credit quality. The model indicates 
that, given low costs for debt issuance, high-quality firms will issue short-term debt when 
they expect to benefit from bondholder scrutiny during the refinancing process, while 
low-quality firms issue long-term debt to avoid re-evaluation. On the other hand, 
abnormally high refinancing costs will lead to a pooling equilibrium where both high- 
quality and low-quality firms issue long-term debt.
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The risk of not being able to refund debt because of deterioration in financial or 
economic conditions can motivate firms to lengthen the maturity of their debt. Sharpe 
(1991) and Titman (1992) suggest that unfavorable news about a borrower may arrive on 
the refinancing date, causing investors not to extend credit or to raise default premia on 
new debt issues. Diamond (1991) refers to this refinancing risk as a liquidity risk in that 
the borrower is forced into an inefficient liquidation because refinancing is unavailable. 
Diamond (1991) builds on Flannery’s (1986) paper by suggesting that high-quality firms 
indeed desire short-term debt but face the risk that refinancing may be unavailable, 
forcing liquidation and loss of control. Thus, the optimal maturity structure is decided by 
a trade-off between its preference for short-term debt based on an expected improvement 
in credit rating and greater liquidity risk. While liquidity risks give some firms an 
incentive to borrow long-term, they may not be able to do so because the rate of return 
required to compensate investors for bearing long-term credit risks can induce firms to 
take risky low-quality projects. According to Diamond (1991), there are two categories of 
short-term borrowers: high-rated borrowers using short-term debt to take advantage of 
the arrival of information and low-rated borrowers who are screened out of the long-term 
debt market because lenders want to keep them on a “short leash.” Thus, long-term bonds 
are issued by those firms having intermediate ratings.
Diamond (1993) develops an asymmetric-information model where debt seniority 
is related to debt maturity. Assuming that credit ratings provide noisy signals for the 
quality of a firm’s projects, lenders have two possible options: (1) liquidating bad 
projects and denying the firm a chance to extract control rents, or (2) simply accepting a 
promised payment at the end of the life of the project in return for forgiving the amount
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of currently due obligations. As a result, high-quality borrowers utilize short-term debt 
since it can be refinanced as positive information is revealed. Alternatively, low-quality 
borrowers have long-term debt in the hope that lenders will not want to liquidate. 
However, in an effort to avoid identifying themselves as low-quality borrowers, they will 
emulate the high-quality borrowers by issuing debt at both ends of the maturity spectrum.
I construct two empirical tests to measure the relationship between firm quality 
and bond duration. First, I test Flannery’s (1986) separating equilibrium hypothesis by 
comparing investment-grade issues with speculative-grade issues. In this case, the 
signaling hypothesis suggests that investment-grade issues should have shorter durations 
than speculative-grade issues. Alternatively, Diamond’s (1993) asymmetric information 
model suggests no difference between bond-rating groups. Second, I test Diamond’s 
(1991) hypothesis by comparing high- and low-rated issues to intermediate-rated issues. 
Asymmetric information theory suggests that both high-rated and low-rated issues should 
have shorter durations than intermediate-rated issues since low-quality firms are screened 
out of the long-term debt market. Even though credit-rating information is publicly 
available, it is used to test the asymmetric information hypothesis since firms with a low 
credit rating are more susceptible to information asymmetry problems than are firms with 
a high credit rating. As a result, firms with a low credit rating are more likely to issue 
short-term debt due to the larger information costs associated with long-term debt.
Agency Problems
Myers (1977) analyzes possible externalities generated by debt on shareholders’ 
(and management’s) optimal investment strategies. According to Myers (1977), in some 
cases, the benefits from undertaking profitable investment projects are split between
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stockholders and bondholders. If debt matures after the expiration of the firm’s 
investment option, profits from investment will accrue, at least partially, to the 
bondholders rather than accrue fully to the shareholders. As a result, a shareholder and 
manager coalition will be reluctant to pursue future investment. Myers calls this the 
underinvestment problem. Myers (1977) predicts that debt maturity after the expiration of 
the growth option causes an underinvestment problem. High-growth opportunity firms 
are more likely to face an underinvestment problem compared with low-growth 
opportunity firms. The implication of the Myers (1977) paper is that firms with a history 
of underinvestment and a large number of growth opportunities should attempt to control 
underinvestment by including less debt in their capital structure, placing restrictive 
covenants on debt issues, or shortening the maturity of debt issues. Empirically, Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Highfield 
(2005) all find that firms with more growth options have shorter-term debt, supporting 
the idea that short-term debt is employed to reduce agency problems. Applying this line 
of logic to bond duration, one would expect high-growth firms to have shorter bond 
duration.
Because small firms typically have more growth opportunities, along with greater 
business risk, they are more susceptible to agency problems than their larger counterparts. 
Thus, small firms in riskier businesses attempt to lower agency costs by issuing short­
term debt. Although several authors (e.g., Mitchell, 1991; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs 
and Mauer, 1996; and Ooi, 1999) find a positive relationship between debt maturity and 
firm size, Carey, Prowse, Rhea, and Udell (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) find that 
firm size is inversely related to debt maturity. Alternatively, Guedes and Opler (1996)
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find that large firms issue at both ends of the maturity spectrum, while small firms tend to 
issue long-term debt. Based on this line of reasoning, one would expect larger firms to 
have longer bond duration.
While some firms struggle with agency problems and benefit from the self- 
imposed discipline of short-term debt, other firms such as utilities and financial 
institutions are monitored by government and industry regulators. Using an agency- 
problem framework, Smith (1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995) suggest that regulations 
reduce managerial discretion and effectively control underinvestment, risk shifting, and 
asset-substitution problems. Citing fewer growth opportunities, Smith (1986), Smith and 
Watts (1992), Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Kirshnaswami, 
Spindit, and Subramaniam (1999), and Highfield (2005) find that regulated firms issue 
long-term debt. Applying this line of logic to bond duration, one would expect to find 
that regulated firms have longer bond duration.
Finally, Raj an (1992) suggests that short-maturity loans provide opportunities for 
lenders to extract rents from borrowers at the time of loan renewal or to subject the 
borrower to a hold-up problem. In the case of syndication, any rents would have to be 
shared with other members of the syndicate; therefore, since the lead bank incurs 
additional costs from the monitoring activities necessary to convince other banks to join 
the syndicate, rent extraction becomes less profitable. Long-term loans lower the overall 
cost of monitoring by allowing these costs to be amortized over time, making the loan 
more profitable for the lead bank in the syndicate. Additionally, short-maturity loans also 
come with more frequent renewals that increase the amount of monitoring necessary to 
convince other banks to join the syndicate. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find that loan
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syndication is directly related to loan maturity; therefore, extending this concept to the 
bond market, on average, one would expect syndicated bond issues to have longer 
durations than their non-syndicated counterparts.
In this essay, I construct four empirical tests for the relationship between agency 
problems and bond duration. First, I test Myers’ (1977) theory that high-growth firms 
have shorter bond duration in an effort to control agency problems. Second, similar to 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996), I test for a direct relationship 
between firm size and bond duration since small firms have more growth opportunities 
and should use short-term debt to control agency problems. Third, consistent with Smith 
(1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995), I test the proposition that regulated firms have 
longer bond duration. Finally, since syndicated loans are effectively a hybrid of public 
and private debt, comparable to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Highfield (2005), I 
test the hypothesis that syndicated bond offerings have longer duration than non­
syndicated offerings.
Data Source
The sample for this essay (Chapter 4) includes 8,627 public, non-convertible 
corporate debt instruments issued between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2002. Issue 
information comes from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum U.S. Corporate New 
Issues database (SDC). Bank debt and commercial paper are not included in the SDC 
database. The SDC database is limited to public debt offerings with a maturity of at least 
one year (defined as 360 days). In addition, I eliminated observations where the issuing 
firm did not have an S&P rating at the time of issuance.
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Table 10 presents sample summary statistics. The bonds in the sample range in 
duration from 0.97 years to over 99.99 years, and the mean duration is 6.10 years. The 
bonds in the sample range in maturity from 1 year to a little over 101 years, and the mean 
maturity is about 9.75 years. Approximately 31 percent of the sample has an S&P A 
rating or above, 2 percent has an S&P B rating or below, and 67 percent falls into the 
S&P middle-rate range. Approximately 94 percent of the sample has an S&P rating in the 
investment-grade range, and 6 percent falls into the S&P high-yield range. About 40 
percent of the bond issues are syndicated. Of those, the average coupon rate is just over 
6.78 percent, and the average firm in the sample has a total market capitalization of $9 
billion.
Table 11 shows the distribution of debt issues in the sample by year of issue. 
Corresponding to the low interest-rate environment of the late 1990s, the heaviest volume 
of new issues in the sample was in 1997 and 1998. As shown in panel A of Table 11, the 
mean duration over the sample period is 6.10 years, ranging from an average duration of 
4.05 years in 2000 to 7.50 years in 1993. Panel B of Table 11 shows the mean maturity 
for the sample, which is 9.75 years. Overall, the mean maturity for the sample ranges 
from an average maturity of 5.71 years in 2000 to 12.22 years in 1991. As a general rule, 
(1) bonds paying interest prior to maturity will have durations less than their maturity, 
and (2) the larger the coupon, the shorter the duration. Table 11 indicates that the mean 
duration is less than the mean maturity for the sample.
Table 12 presents the distribution of debt issues by duration across bond ratings. 
As one would expect for new bond issues, the sample contains relatively few high-yield 
rated bonds as compared to the number of investment-grade bonds. In fact, the sample
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Table 10 Sample Descriptive Statistics
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments issued placed in U.S. markets betw een January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2002. The descriptive statistics o f  the sample are presented below.
VARIABLE N M EAN STD DEV M IN IM U M M AXIM UM
Coupon 8627 6.779 1.506 0.000 17.000
Duration 8627 6.097 3.734 0.973 99.990
Maturity 8627 9.751 9.937 1.000 101.464
Log (M aturity) 8627 1.857 0.974 0.000 4.619
M arket-to-book 8627 1.073 3.167 0.995 264.285
Regulate 8627 0.685 0.464 0.000 1.000
Log (Total Cap) 8627 22.919 1.771 14.224 28.360
DEratio 8627 9.187 177.180 0.000 99.000
SYNDICATE 8627 0.401 0.490 0.000 1.000
Multiple 8627 0.289 0.453 0.000 1.000
Financial 8627 0.504 0.500 0.000 1.000
HIGHTECH 4937 0.163 0.369 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating AAA 8627 0.045 0.207 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating AA 8627 0.162 0.368 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating A 8627 0.450 0.497 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating BBB 8627 0.285 0.451 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating BB 8627 0.034 0.182 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating B 8627 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000
S&P Rating CCC 8627 0.001 0.044 0.000 1.000
S&P Highrate 8627 0.657 0.474 0.000 1.000
S&P Midrate 8627 0.320 0.466 0.000 1.000
S&P Lowrate 8627 0.022 0.147 0.000 1.000
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Table 11 Time Distribution of Debt Issues
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments placed in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and December 
31, 2002. The to tal num ber o f  issues per year and the m ean duration o f  the issues placed each year are 
presented below.
Panel A: Time Distribution o f  D ebt Issues Duration
Year o f  Issuance Total N um ber o f  Issues M ean D uration in Years
1990 145 6.27
1991 248 6.71








2 0 0 0 654 4.05
2 0 0 1 973 5.18
2 0 0 2 90 5.67
Total 8627 6 . 1 0
Panel B: Time Distribution o f  D ebt Issues Maturity
Year o f  Issuance Total Num ber o f  Issues M ean M aturity in Years
1990 145 11.91
1991 248 1 2 .2 2
1992 414 10.80
1993 536 1 1 .6 6






2 0 0 0 654 5.71
2 0 0 1 973 9.33
2 0 0 2 90 8.14
Total 8627 9.75
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Table 12 Distribution of Debt Issues by Duration Across S&P Bond Ratings
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments p laced in U.S. m arkets between January 1, 1990 and December 
31, 2002. This table shows the distribution o f  the debt issues by S&P bond rating and term  to duration. The 
m ean and standard deviation o f  bond duration for each rating class are also presented.
S & P  B ond R a tin g
Duration AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Total
X < 2 1 0 1 619 612 173 3 0 0 1508
2 < X <  5 47 233 1068 626 78 2 2 0 2074
5 < X < 7 26 1 1 0 483 438 125 1 0 0 10 1292
7 < X  < 10 54 294 1209 876 72 49 7 2561
1 0  < X  < 2 0 160 138 507 352 18 3 0 1178
20 < X < 30 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 5
30 < X 1 4 3 1 0 0 0 9
Total 389 1399 3884 2467 297 174 17 8627
M ean Duration 7.79 4.58 6.09 6.67 6.13 6.39 6.67 6 . 1 0
Std. Dev. 5.24 4.08 5.24 3.59 2.30 1.42 1.19 3.73
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does not contain any observations with CC, C, or D ratings. In this sample, 56 percent of 
the issues has a duration under 7 years; 15 percent of the sample has a duration between 7 
and 10 years; and 29 percent has a duration of 10 years or greater. Of bonds with an S&P 
rating of A or higher, 47 percent has a duration of 5 years or less, and only 1 percent has 
a duration of 20 years or greater. Thus, over 52 percent of the sample having a high S&P 
rating has a duration between 5 and 20 years. Conversely, of bond issues with an S&P 
rating of BBB or lower, 15 percent has a duration of 5 years or less, and 13 percent has a 
duration of 20 years or greater. Thus, about 72 percent of the sample with an S&P rating 
of BBB or lower has a duration of 5 to 20 years. As a check, I regress the duration on 
S&P investment-grade credit ratings and S&P speculative-grade credit ratings. At the 
same time, I limit the durations to 20 years or less, since 99 percent of the observations 
has a duration of less than 20 years. As shown in Table 13, the issues with investment- 
grade ratings tend to have longer durations than their high-yield counterparts.
Table 14 presents the distribution of debt issues by maturity across S&P bond 
ratings. There are 43 percent of the issues having a maturity under 7 years; 11 percent of 
the sample has a maturity between 7 and 10 years; and 46 percent has a maturity of 10 
years or greater. Table 14 shows that, in general, as bond ratings decline, the mean term 
to maturity declines.
Of the 5,672 bonds with an S&P rating of A or higher, 1,906 (34 percent) have 
maturities of less than 5 years, and 768 (14 percent) have maturities of 20 years or greater. 
Thus, approximately 53 percent of the sample with a high S&P rating falls in the maturity 
range of 5 to 20 years. Conversely, of the 2,955 bond issues with an S&P rating of BBB 
or lower, only 452 (15 percent) have maturities of less than 5 years, and 387 (13 percent)
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Table 13 Distribution of Debt Issues by Duration Across S&P Bond Ratings (Regression Results)
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments placed in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and Decem ber 
31, 2002. The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S&P A AA is a binary variable equal 
to one for bonds issued by firms w ith Standard and Poor’s AAA credit rating at the tim e o f  issuance, zero 
otherwise. S&P AA is a binary variable equal to  one for bonds issued by firms w ith Standard and P oor’s 
AA credit rating at the tim e o f  issuance, zero otherwise. S&P A is a binary variable equal to one for bonds 
issued by firms w ith S tandard and Poor’s A credit rating at the tim e o f  issuance, zero otherwise. S&P BBB 
is a binary variable equal to  one for bonds issued by firms with Standard and P oor’s BBB credit rating at 
the tim e o f  issuance, zero otherwise. S&P BB is a binary variable equal to one for bonds issued by firms 
with Standard and P oor’s BB credit rating at the tim e o f  issuance, zero otherwise. S&P B is a binary 
variable equal to one for bonds issued by firms w ith Standard and Poor’s B credit rating at the tim e o f 
issuance, zero otherwise. S&P CCC is a binary variable equal to  one for bonds issued by firms with 
Standard and P oor’s CCC credit rating at the tim e o f  issuance, zero otherwise. The t-statistics for each 
coefficient reported in parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 





INTERCEPT 6 .2 0 *** 6.05









S&P BB 0 .0 2
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Table 14 Distribution of Debt Issues by Maturity Across S&P Bond Ratings
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments placed in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and Decem ber 
31, 2002. This table shows the distribution o f  the debt issues by S&P bond rating and term  to maturity. The 
mean and standard deviation o f  term  to m aturity for each rating class are also presented.
S & P B ond R a tin g
Term to 
Maturity
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Total
X < 2 83 563 437 60 2 0 0 1145
2 < X  < 5 38 175 610 355 31 4 0 1213
5 < X  < 7 35 127 727 422 55 19 2 1387
7 < X  < 10 18 77 371 339 84 57 7 953
10 < X < 2 0 61 329 1253 924 106 93 8 2774
20 < X  < 30 49 41 185 1 2 2 14 1 0 412
30 < X 105 87 301 245 5 0 0 743
Total 389 1399 3884 2467 297 174 17 8627
M ean Term to 
M aturity
15.19 7.23 9.54 10.83 8.78 8.87 8.65 9.75
Std. Dev. 13.84 10.07 9.38 10.30 4.97 2.40 1 .8 8 9.94
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have maturities of 20 years or greater. Thus, approximately 72 percent of the sample with 
an S&P rating of BBB or lower falls in the maturity range of 5 to 20 years. The 
distribution of debt issues by maturity across bond ratings shown in Table 14 confirms 
the results shown in Table 12.
Methods and Results 
I calculate the duration as follows:
1C 2C nC nM
Macaulay Duration = 1 + >̂ (l + y ) ----------(l ±Z 2 L J h l L  (6)
Where
P -  price of the bond
C = semiannual coupon interest (in dollars)
y = one-half the yield to maturity or required yield
n = number of semiannual periods (number of years x 2)
M=  maturity value (in dollars)
Using the duration of the bond issue as the dependent variable, the following 
specifications of bond issue duration are estimated:
DURATION =  /30 +  P^S&P INVEST + /3 2MV/BVi +  /?3REGULATE.
+  /3^LN(TOTALCAP)i +  / 3sSYNDICATEj +  CONTROL VARIABLES +  Ej
DURATION  =  /?0 +  P^S&P HIGHRATE.+P2S&P LOW RATE^^M V/BV  +  P^REGULATE:f
(̂ )
+  P sLN(TOTALCAP)t +  P 6SYNDICATEj +  CONTROL VARIABLES +  S j
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The control variables include a binary variable for multiple issues by the same
firm and the total-debt-to-equity ratio (Debt/Equity).29 The t-values are computed using
White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSEs).
Signaling and Asymmetric 
Information
Equation (8) allows me to test Flannery’s (1986) separating equilibrium 
hypothesis. I compare investment-grade issues to speculative-grade issues by including a 
binary variable. S&P INVEST denotes bonds issued by firms with S&P investment-grade 
credit ratings at the time of issuance. Table 15 presents the regression model coefficient 
estimates. Column (1) reports the full regression estimates, column (2) reports the 
estimation excluding financial firms, and column (3) reports the estimation for financial 
firms only.30
The signaling hypothesis is confirmed if investment-grade issues have shorter 
durations than speculative-grade issues, but Diamond’s (1993) asymmetric information 
model suggests no difference between the bond rating groups. Unlike Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), I do not find evidence supporting Flannery’s (1986) signaling hypothesis. In 
addition, the empirical results in this chapter do not support Diamond’s (1993) 
asymmetric information model that there is no difference between investment-grade 
issues and speculative-grade issues. Instead, the results of this study suggest that 
investment-grade firms issue debt with a longer duration than their high-yield 
counterparts, on average.
29The F-test shown in Table 15 fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on 
MV/BV, Debt/Equity, and LNTOTALCAP are jo in tly  zero.
30An exam ination o f  the conditional num ber and variance o f  inflation factors does not indicate a 
problem with multicollinearity.
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Table 15 Regression Models
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments placed in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and Decem ber 
31, 2002. The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S&P INV EST is a binary variable 
equal to one for bonds issued by firms with Standard and Poor’s investm ent-grade credit rating at the time 
o f  issuance, or zero otherw ise. SYNDICATE is a  binary variable for bond issues that are syndicated. 
LNTOTALCAP is the natural logarithm o f  the total capitalization o f  the issuing firm. (M V/BV) is the 
issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book ratio. The control variables (not presented) include (Debt/Equity), the total- 
debt-to-equity ratio, and M ULTIPLE, a binary variable for m ultiple issues by the sam e firm. The t-statistics 
for each coefficient reported in parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors (HCSEs), and statistical significance is displayed by the use o f  one (10% ), two (5 %), and three (1%) 
stars.
A ll Issues N on-financial Issues Financial Issues
INTERCEPT 12.78— 10.81*** 8.18“ *
(24.00) (12.56) (9.60)
S&P INVEST 0.65*** 1.14” * -0.45
(3.79) (6.72) (-1 .0 1 )
MV/BV -0.07 0.08 -0.08
(-0.64) (0.03) (-0.58)
REGULATE -0.93*” 0.28” *
(-10.64) (2.81)
LNTOTOTALCAP -0.32"** -0 .2 2 *** -0.14*”
(-13.54) (-5.66) (-4.30)
DERATIO 0 .0 2 ” 0 .0 1 * 0.05
(2.23) (1.95) (1.04)
SYNDICATE 1.57*** 1 .0 0 *** 1.74***
(19.73) ( 1 0 . 1 1 ) (13.40)
MULTIPLE 0.14* -0.43*” 0.42**"
( 1 .6 8 ) (-4.02) (3.22)
R-SQUARE 0.1039 0.0447 0.0506
ADJ R-SQUARE 0.1031 0.0431 0.0491
H0: (MV/BV) = (Debt/Equity) = 
LNTOTALCAP= 0 62.20*** 11.72*” 6.45***
OBSERVATIONS 8627 4274 4353
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Equation (9) allows me to specifically examine Diamond’s (1991) hypothesis that 
there is a nonmonotonic structure in credit ratings. I compare high-rated and low-rated 
issues to intermediate-rated issues by including two binary variables. S&P HIGHRATE is 
a binary variable for bonds issued by firms rated as AAA, AA, or A by S&P at the time 
of issuance. S&P LOWRATE is a binary variable for bonds issued by firms rated as B, 
CCC, or D by S&P at the time of issuance. These results are shown in Table 16.
I find that high-rated firms tend to issue debt with longer durations than middle­
rated companies. The coefficient for low-rated firms is not statistically significant except 
for the issues restricted to non-financial firms. This direct relationship between credit 
ratings and duration is inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991) hypothesis that there is a 
nonmonotonic structure in credit ratings, and it is also inconsistent with Diamond’s (1993) 
asymmetric information model that low-quality issuers attempt to emulate high-quality 
issuers.
Agency Problems
Four empirical tests are constructed in this essay (Chapter 4) to evaluate the 
relationship between agency problems and bond duration. First, a growth measure, the 
issuing firm’s market-to-book ratio (MV/BV), is used to test Myers’ (1977) theory that 
firms with high growth opportunities have shorter bond duration in an effort to control 
agency problems. Inconsistent with Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), 
Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Highfield (2005), I find that all coefficient estimates for 
MV/BV are statistically insignificant.
Since small firms have more growth opportunities and should issue short-term 
debt to control agency problems, in the second empirical test regarding agency problems,
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Table 16 Regression Models
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments placed in U.S. markets betw een January 1, 1990 and Decem ber 
31, 2002. The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S&P HIG H RA TE is a binary variable 
for bonds issued by firm s rated as AAA, AA, or A by S&P at the tim e o f  issuance. S&P LOW RATE is a 
binary variable for bonds issued by firms rated as B, CCC, D by S&P at the tim e o f  issuance. SYNDICATE 
is a binary variable for bond issues that are syndicated. LNTO TA LCA P is the natural logarithm o f  the total 
capitalization o f  the issuing firm. (M V/BV) is the issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book ratio. The control 
variables (not presented) include (Debt/Equity), the total-debt-to-equity ratio, and M ULTIPLE, a binary 
variable for m ultiple issues by the same firm. The t-statistics for each coefficient reported in parentheses 
are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSEs), and statistical significance is 
displayed by the use o f  one (10%), two (5 %), and three (1%) stars.
A ll Issues N on-F inancial Issues Financial Issues
INTERCEPT 13.66*** 11.93*** 7.44*"
24.11) (13.22) (8.59)
S&P HIGHRATE 0.27*“ 0.59*** -0.19
(2.99) (5.83) (-1 . 1 0 )
S&P LOWRATE -0.36 -0.53* 0.16
(-1.30) (-1.94) (0 .2 0 )
MV/BV -0.08 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 2
(-0 .6 6 ) (-0 .0 1 ) (-0.58)
REGULATE -0.94*“ 0.25”
(-10.73) (2.55)
LNTOTOTALCAP -0.34*** -0.24*” -0 . 1 2 “ *
(-13.26) (-5.92) (-3.20)
DERATIO 0 .0 1 “ 0 .0 2 * 0.05
(2 .2 0 ) (1.87) (1.05)
SYNDICATE 1.61 — 1.07"* 1.73*”
(19.68) (10.59) (3.11)
MULTIPLE 0.15 * -0.42*** 0.41” *
(1.78) (-3.90) (3.11)
R-SQUARE 0.1036 0.0441 0.0507
ADJ R-SQUARE 0.1027 0.0423 0.0489
H„: (MV/BV) = (Debt/Equity) 
= LNTOTALCAP= 0 59.78” * 12.64*** 3.74***
OBSERVATIONS 8627 4274 4353
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I test for a direct relationship between firm size and duration using the natural logarithm 
of the total capitalization of the issuing firm (LNTOTALCAP). Consistent with Carey et 
al. (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001), I find that bond duration is inversely related to 
firm size, a finding inconsistent with Myers’ (1977) hypothesis that small firms use short­
term debt to control agency problems.
The hypothesis that regulated firms have long-term debt is also tested by using a 
binary variable for regulated firms (REGULATE). Inconsistent with Smith (1986) and 
Barclay and Smith (1995), the findings in the third test regarding agency problems 
indicate that regulated firms have shorter duration, with one exception: non-financial 
institutions. Once the sample is restricted to non-fmancial firms, the results indicate that 
regulated firms tend to issue debt with longer durations than non-regulated firms, a 
finding consistent with the hypothesis that government regulation can effectively control 
agency problems such as underinvestment, risk shifting, and asset substitution. As an 
alternative specification, I also test the hypothesis that regulated firms have longer 
durations by introducing an interaction term (INTERACTION) between REGULATE 
and FINANCIAL (a binary variable for financial firms). As shown in Tables 17 and 18, 
coefficient estimates on INTERACTION are negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that regulated financial firms have shorter durations.
A binary variable for syndicated issues (SYNDICATE) is used to test the 
hypothesis that syndicated offerings have longer durations. Supporting Dennis and 
Mullineaux (1999) and Highfield (2005), regardless of sample selection, the fourth test 
regarding agency problems indicates that syndicated offerings have longer durations than
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Table 17 Regression Models
The sample contains 8,627 debt instrum ents placed in U.S. markets betw een January 1, 1990 and December
31 ,2002. The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S&P HIG H RA TE is a  binary variable 
for bonds issued by firm s rated as AAA, AA, or A by S&P at the tim e o f  issuance. S&P LOW RATE is a 
binary variable for bonds issued by firm s rated as B, CCC, and D by S&P at the tim e o f issuance. 
SYNDICATE is a binary variable for bond issues that are syndicated. LN TO TA LCA P is the natural 
logarithm o f the to tal capitalization o f  the issuing firm. (M V/BV) is the issuing firm ’s market-to-book 
ratio. The control variables (not presented) include (Debt/Equity), the total-debt-to-equity ratio, and 
M ULTIPLE, a binary variable for m ultiple issues by the same firm. INTERA C TIO N  is the interaction term 
between REG U LATE and FIN A NCIA L binary variables. The t-statistics for each coefficient reported in 
parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSEs), and statistical 




















H0: (MV/BV) =(Debt/Equity) = LNTOTALCAP = 0 62.20***
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Table 18 Regression Models
The sample contains 8,627 debt instruments placed in U.S. markets betw een January 1, 1990 and December
31 ,2002 . The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S&P HIGHRATE is a  binary variable 
for bonds issued by firm s rated as AAA, AA, or A by S&P at the tim e o f  issuance. S&P LOW RATE is a 
binary variable for bonds issued by firms rated as B, CCC, and D by S&P at the tim e o f  issuance. 
SYNDICATE is a binary variable for bond issues that are syndicated. LNTOTALCAP is the natural 
logarithm o f the total capitalization o f  the issuing firm. (M V/BV) is the issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book 
ratio. The control variables (not presented) include (Debt/Equity), the total-debt-to-equity ratio, and 
M ULTIPLE, a binary variable for m ultiple issues by the same firm. IN TERA C TIO N  is the interaction term  
between REG U LATE and FIN A NCIA L binary variables. The t-statistics for each coefficient reported in 
parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSEs), and statistical 














DERATIO 0 .0 1 **
(2.40)









H0: (MV/BV) = (Debt/Equity) = LNTOTALCAP = 0
8627
OBSERVATIONS
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their non-syndicated counterparts. As shown in Tables 15 and 16, all coefficients for 
SYNDICATE are statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the proposition 
that long-term loans help control agency problems associated with bank monitoring and 
rent extraction.
Comparison of Duration and Maturity 
Empirical Findings
In the previous sections, I use the hypotheses that have been offered to test 
corporate debt maturity to examine firms’ duration choices to determine if factors that 
influence firms’ debt-maturity decisions also affect duration choices. Most of the results 
in this chapter support the findings of previous empirical work that examines the 
determinants of debt maturity except for two major hypotheses. Stohs and Mauer (1996) 
support the signaling hypothesis by Flannery (1986) and find that investment-grade 
issues have shorter maturity than speculative-grade issues. They also find strong support 
for the prediction of a nonmonotonic relationship between debt maturity and bond rating; 
firms with high or very low bond ratings use short-term debt. In contrast, I find that 
investment-grade firms issue debt having longer durations than their high-yield 
counterparts. I also find a direct relationship between bond duration and firm quality as 
measured by credit ratings. One possible reason for this finding is that high-quality firms 
are able to pay lower coupons because of their high credit ratings. As a result, their debts 
have longer durations than debt issued by low-quality firms. Similarly, low-quality firms 
are forced to issue short-term debt and to pay higher coupons because of their poor credit 
ratings. As a consequence, their debts have shorter durations than debt issued by their 
high-quality counterparts.
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Conclusions
Much theoretical and empirical research focuses on the determinants of debt 
maturity. In this chapter, departure is made from earlier studies by examining the 
duration of debt issues. As an exploratory investigation, this chapter searches for 
potential linkages between the various theories and empirical findings from the previous 
literature on debt maturity and bond duration. I examine a sample of 8,627 debt issues 
from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database to identify the important factors in 
determining the length of duration of public, non-convertible debt. I use Macaulay’s 
Duration as the dependent variable to test theoretical hypotheses where bond duration is 
influenced by signaling and asymmetric information as well as agency problems.
My study finds no support for the signaling hypothesis, nor does it find support 
for the theory of a nonmonotonic structure in credit ratings where firms with very high 
and very low credit ratings have shorter durations, while firms with intermediate credit 
ratings have longer durations. Instead, I find a direct relationship between bond duration 
and firm quality as measured by credit ratings. This evidence is in line with Diamond’s 
(1991) hypothesis that risky firms are screened out of the long-term debt market.
For agency problems, the issuing firm’s market-to-book ratio is used as a growth 
measure to test Myers’ (1977) theory; however, no support is found in this essay for the 
hypothesis that high-growth firms have shorter duration. Alternatively, consistent with 
Carey et al. (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001), I find that larger firms have shorter 
debt durations than their smaller counterparts. Thus, these findings contradict Myers’ 
(1977) hypothesis that small firms have short-term debt to mitigate agency problems. 
Inconsistent with Smith (1996) and Barclay and Smith (1995), I find that regulated firms
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have shorter debt duration, with one exception: non-financial institutions. Once the 
sample is restricted to non-financial firms, the results indicate that regulated firms tend to 
issue debt with longer duration than non-regulated firms. Finally, strong evidence is 
found to support the hypothesis that syndicated public debt offerings, like syndicated 
bank loans, have longer duration than their non-syndicated counterparts.
In this essay (Chapter 4), I investigate whether any systematic characteristics lead 
firms to determine duration choices. Although this essay supports some work and raises 
questions with respect to other work, questions remain concerning the duration choice of 
debt issued by U.S. corporations. For example, why is duration a better measurement of a 
firm’s interest-rate risk than maturity? Additional research on comparing both approaches 
may also contribute to understanding of the results presented here.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation is a collection of three research essays examining (1) bank 
lending and interest-rate derivatives [Chapter 2], (2) use of interest-rate derivatives and 
bank holding company interest-rate risk [Chapter 3], and (3) duration of corporate debt 
issues [Chapter 4].
The first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2) documents a positive relationship 
between derivative usage by U.S. banks and growth in their commercial and industrial 
loan portfolios. More specifically, it is found that the aggregate use of derivative 
instruments, in particular interest-rate options, interest-rate forwards, and interest-rate 
futures, is associated with higher growth rates in C&I loans. These findings are consistent 
with the results of earlier studies by Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) who examine the 
relationship between lending and derivative usage for a sample of FDIC-insured 
commercial banks between 1985 and 1992. This documented positive association is 
consistent with Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that derivative contracting and lending are 
complementary activities. Diamond’s model predicts that banks can reduce the cost of 
delegated monitoring by holding a diversified portfolio. Engaging in derivative activities 
helps banks reduce the cost of monitoring contracts issued to their loan customers, 
thereby enabling banks to increase their lending activities without increasing the total risk 
level faced by the banks.
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The major finding of the second essay (Chapter 3) is that stock returns of a bank 
holding company using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes, controlling 
for balance sheet composition and asset size. This finding is consistent with the results of 
an earlier study by Schrand (1997) who studies a sample of publicly traded savings and 
loan associations (S&Ls) from 1984 to 1988. In addition, the findings in this essay are 
statistically and economically significant. In fact, the sample results suggest that a bank 
holding company, on average, would have to use $209.37 million of capital each year to 
shift the interest-rate beta down by 35 basis points if it did not use interest-rate 
derivatives to hedge against interest-rate risk. This result is consistent with Diamond’s 
(1984) prediction that a bank can successfully use interest-rate derivatives to hedge 
against interest-rate risk. Furthermore, the sample results in this essay (Chapter 3) also 
suggest that restrictive policies for banks’ derivative activities may have negative 
consequences in innovation promotion and more effective bank risk management. The 
possibility that the use of interest-rate derivative instruments is associated with lower 
bank holding companies’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity implies that restrictions on 
bank participation in financial derivatives could prevent banks from managing interest- 
rate risk more effectively.
Much theoretical and empirical research focuses on the determinants of debt 
maturity. In the third essay (Chapter 4), departure is made from earlier studies by 
examining the duration of debt issues. A sample of 8,627 debt issues from the Thomson 
Financial SDC Platinum database is examined to identify the important factors in 
determining the length of duration of public, non-convertible debt. Macaulay’s Duration
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is used as the dependent variable to test the theoretical hypotheses that bond duration is 
influenced by signaling and asymmetric information as well as agency problems.
The major finding of the third essay (Chapter 4) in this dissertation is that firm 
quality, as measured by credit rating, is directly related to bond duration. Evidence 
suggesting that bond duration is inversely related to firm size is also found. In addition, 
this essay also finds that regulated non-financial firms have longer bond durations and 
that syndicated offerings have longer durations than non-syndicated offerings.
Although the third essay (Chapter 4) supports some work and raises questions 
with respect to other work, questions still remain regarding the duration choice of debt 
issued by U.S. corporations. For example, why is duration a better measurement of a 
firm’s interest-rate risk than maturity? Additional research comparing both measures may 
contribute to further understanding of the results presented here.
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APPENDIX A
FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF 
DERIVATIVE USAGE
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First-stage Estim ation o f  Probability o f  Derivative U sage a,b








aThe probit specification is estim ated for each quarter for 36 quarters from  1996 Q1 through 2004 Q4. The 
m ean estimates and the standard error are the mean and the standard error o f  36 coefficient estimates.
b The dependent variable for the first-stage regression is the probability o f  derivative usage. OPPRF is the 
sample banks’ net interest margin. CARATIO is the sam ple banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. LNTOTASST is 
the logarithm o f  the sam ple banks’ total assets, and LA GD EPEN D EN T is the first lag o f  the dependent 
variable.
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APPENDIX B
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES ON THE TIME-INDICATOR 
VARIABLE FOR EACH REGRESSION OVER THE 
PERIOD FROM MARCH 1996 THROUGH 
DECEMBER 2004
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C oefficient Estim ates on the Tim e-indicator Variable for Each Regression 
over the Period from M arch 1996 through D ecem ber 2004.
Independent Variables Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4)
Intercept -0.00521 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0055
(-3.95)*** (-1.72) * (-1.73) * (-1.49)
D2 (1996Q3) -0.0075 -0.0023 -0.0023 0.0027
(-5.67) *** (-2.73) *** (-2.74) *** (1.91) **
D3 (1996Q4) -0,0048 0.0004 0.0004 0.0016
(-3.60) *** (0.27) (0.28) (3.85) ***
D4 (1997Q1) -0.0059 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0022
(-4.47) *** (-0.87) (-0.87) (4.60) ***
D5 (1997Q2) -0,0054 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-4.05) *** (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.38)
D6 (1997Q3) -0.0079 -0.0027 -0.0027 0.0014
(-5.90) *** (-2.84) *** (-2.84) *** (2.99) ***
D7 (1997Q4) -0.0063 -0.001 -0.0011 0.0071
(-4.64) *** (-1.24) (-1.26) (1.18)
D8 (1998Q1) -0.0004 0.0048 0.0048 0.0013
(-0.27) (0.80) (0.80) (3.15) ***
D9 (1998Q2) -0.0064 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0006
(-4.72) *** (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.37)
DIO (1998Q3) -0,0084 -0.0032 -0.0032 0.0012
(-6.18)“ * (-3.62) *** (-3.63) *** (2.30) **
D ll  (1998Q4) -0.0084 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0013
(-6.18) *** (-1.26) (-1.27) (3.04) ***
D12 (1999Q1) -0.0063 -0.001 -0.001 0.0020
(-4.58) *** (-1.13) (-1.13) (2.47) **
D13 (1999Q2) -0.0062 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0004
(-4.55) **’ (-0.51) (-0.55) (0.49)
D14 (1999Q3) -0.0051 -0.0021 -0.0021 0.0028
(-1.50) (-1.86)* (-1.86) * (4.25) ***
D15 (1999Q4) -0.0067 0.0007 0,0007 0,0057
(-1.94)* (0.70) (0.62) (4.12) ***
D16 (2000Q1) -0.0039 0.0033 0.0032 0.0026
(-1.14) (2,07) ** (2.03) ** (6.15) ***
D17 (2000Q2) -0.0014 0.0002 0,0003 0.0004
(-0.41) (0.32) (0.33) (0.98)
D18 (2000Q3) -0.0049 -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0059
(-3.61) *** (-1.51) (-1-51) (1.54)
D19 (2000Q4) -0.0067 0.0035 0.0035 0.0010
(-4.81)*** (0.90) (0.90) (1.50)
D20 (2001Q1) -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0016
(-1.25) (-1.06) (-1.04) (2.54) **
D21 (2001Q2) -0,0063 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0012
(-4.52)*** (-1.05) (-1.05) (-2.07) **
D22 (2001Q3) -0.0062 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0001
(-4.84) *** (-4.07) *** (-4.07) *** (-0.15)
D23 (2001Q4) -0.0091 -0.0024 -0.0024 0,0006
(-7.14) *** (-2.29) (-2.29) ** (0.49)
D24 (2002Q1) -0.0077 -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0007
(-5.95) *“ (-1.14) (-1.13) (1.28)
D25 (2002Q2) -0.0069 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0014
(-5.35) *** (-2.16) ** (-2.15) ** (-2.37) **
D26 (2002Q3) -0.0072 -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0002
(-5.59) *** (-4.35) *** (-4.34) *** (-0.04)
D27 (2002Q4) -0.0093 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0003
(-7.18) *** (-2.75) ** (-2.73) **- (0.54)
D28 (2003Q1) -0.0079 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0007
(-6.07) *** (-2.10) ** (-2.07) ** (-1.35)
D29 (2003Q2) -0.0074 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0022
(-5.66) *** (-3.57) *** (-3.55) *** (-3.78) ***
D30 (2003Q3) -0.0085 -0,0048 -0.0048 0.0001
(-6.53) *** (-5.27) *** (-5.24) *** (0.19)
D31 (2003Q4) -0.010 -0.0023 -0.0023 0.0004
(-7.74) *** (-2.47) ** (-2.44) *** (0.55)
D32 (2004Q1) -0.0076 -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0002
(-5.78) *** (-2.14) ** (-2.11) **« (0.35)
D33 (2004Q2) -0.0074 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0008
(-5.60) *** (-2.31)** (-2.28) *** (-1.48)
D34 (2004Q3) -0,0074 -0.0034 -0.0034 0.0001
(-5.64) *** (-3.83) *** (-3.79) *** (0.23)
D35 (2004Q4) -0.0086 -0.0024 -0.0024 (0.079)
(-6.58) *** (-2.53) ** (-2.49) ** (2.16) **
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